ANUPAM DAS Vs. MAMPI DAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision petition under article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against a common interlocutory order dated 8-12-2006 purportedly passed under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and under Section 20 (3) of the Hindu adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, by the learned District Judge, Shillong in Misc. (Main) Petition Nos. 13 (H) and 14 (H) of 2006 directing the revision-petitioner to pay Rs. 1,000/- per month to the respondent and another sum of Rs. 500/- per month to her minor child for their respective maintenance.

(2.) THE relevant facts giving rise to this revision petition are not in dispute. The petitioner was married to the respondent on 26-8-2002 in accordance with the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and the same was duly registered with the Office of the Registrar of Marriage, East Khasi Hills district, Meghalaya. The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was again solemnized on 3-10-2002 at Kamakhya temple at Guwahati according to Hindu rites. From this marriage, a male child, namely, Master Hritik Das, who is now aged about 4 years, was born to them on 1-9-2003. The minor boy is in the custody of the respondent. Subsequently, marital disputes apparently arose between the spouses. Alleging that she has been subjected to mental and physical cruelty, the respondent filed a petition under Section 13 (1) (i-a) of the hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the learned district Judge. Shillong for dissolving her marriage with the petitioner by a decree of divorce. The divorce petition was registered as Divorce Case No. 4 (H) of 2006. The respondent side by side filed two miscellaneous applications for herself and on behalf of her minor-son purportedly under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for permanent alimony and under Section 20 (3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 for maintenance, which were registered as Misc. (Maint) Petition No. 13 (H) 2006 and Misc. (Maint) Petition No. 15 (H) of 2006. It was on the basis of the aforesaid applications that the impugned order of maintenance was passed.

(3.) ASSAILING the impugned order, Ms. A paul, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the learned District Judge grossly erred in law, and acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance allowance to the respondent under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act when this provision is solely concerned with permanent alimony and not interim maintenance allowance. She further submits that the learned District judge has completely overlooked the glaring legal position that permanent alimony could be granted only after/at the time of passing of a decree for annulment of marriage. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that when the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent had been solemnized and duly registered with the Registrar of Marriage under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, the learned District Judge has no inherent jurisdiction to entertain and proceed with the divorce petition filed by the respondent under Section 13 (1) (i-a) of the Hindu marriage Act; such proceedings and the impugned order passed in connection therewith are, therefore, null and void. In support of her contention, she refers me to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Prabir chandra Chatterjee v. Kaveri Guha chatterjee, AIR 1987 Cal 191. On the other hand, Mr. L. R. Das, the learned counsel for the respondent, submits that the divorce petition may have been wrongly labelled as one under Section 13 (l) (i-a) of the Hindu marriage Act, but when the petition apparently discloses a cause of action for divorce on the grounds of acts of cruelty under Section 27 (1) (d) of the Special Marriage Act, which is the case here, the learned District judge, Shillong, certainly has the jurisdiction to entertain the divorce petition and grant appropriate relief; it is a settled position of law that errors in nomenclature cannot be a ground for ousting the jurisdiction of the District Court to try the divorce petition inasmuch as it is one constituted as a district Court for the purpose of the Hindu marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act. Strong reliance is placed by him on the decision of the Apex Court in Challamane huchha Gowda v. M. R. Tura, (2004) 1 SCC 453 to buttress his contention. Drawing my attention to Prabir Chandra Chatterjee case (supra), the case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he forcefully submits that this case, instead of helping the case of the petitioner, applies to the instant case on all fours. In that view of the matter, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, the impugned proceeding and order do not suffer from any infirmity warranting the interference of this Court.