RANJIT ROY Vs. RAJ KUMAR DAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By this petition under Section 115 CPC the petitioner seeks to challenge the appellate order dated 21.12.94 as passed by the Asstt. District Judge, Silchar in Misc Case No. 83/94 preferred in Misc Appeal No. 31/94. The matter relates to acceptance of tender submitted by respondent No. 1. Plaintiff-respondent No. 1's case was that he had submitted tender for supply of dietory articles [in response to the tender notice dated 31.10.94. Plaintiff having lost in his bid, challenged the acceptance of tender and orders issued in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3. His sole grievance was that his bid being lower than the bid of successful tenderers, it ought to have been accepted. He also made allegation that there were some alteration or modification in the rates quoted by the successful bidder. He therefore filed the suit praying for a declaration that the orders of acceptance of tender were irregular, illegal, collusive and therefore void in law, and also prayed for an injunction. The trial Court dismissed the same on the short ground that the date for acceptance of tender by that time i.e. 6.12.94, had already passed, but the lower appellate Court has granted injunction.

(2.) Heard Mr. M.H.R. Borbhuyan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Notice of motion although issued in compliance of this Court's order dated 11.1.95 and duly served on the respondents have not entered appearance.

(3.) Going through the appellate order, which is quite elaborate so much so even the appellate Court at one stage felt and observed." I have discussed in details above and normally it would appear that as if I have decided the merit of the main suit in disposing the injunction application at this appellate stage." The appellate Court further observed that a careful perusal of the documents was necessary for disposing the injunction application. But in this exercise what has been missed by the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court is, consideration of Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act which provides for exigency or cause when injunction can be refused. This aspect of the matter even in the so called detailed enquiry by the learned Judge has escaped his notice. Clause (e) of Section 41 clearly provides that an injunction can not be granted to prevent breach of contract, the purpose of which would not be specifically in force. There is yet another aspect in such contractual matters, where its basis was worst, the loss occasioned is pecuniary loss which can well be compensated in terms of money. It can hardly be said to be irreparable injury. A person having offered his bid and if his tender has been wrongfully rejected at best he suffers some monetory loss which he can claim by taking recourse to appropriate remedy. In order to seek specific performance the plaintiff is to show that the defendant is under obligation meaning thereby a duty enforceable by law. There was no such duty cast on the defendant which could be enforced by law to accept the plaintiffs tender. It is a matter of common knowledge, even a bidder offering lesser bid can not insist for acceptance of his tender on that count. Even a less bid is liable to be rejected of course on some valid tenable ground. Acceptance of bid, can not legally be insisted. The plaintiff had utterly failed in making out the substance of legal obligation enforceable on law in his favour.