LAWS(GAU)-1996-8-6

KHURAIJAM SOMOI SINGH Vs. STATE OF MANIPUR

Decided On August 16, 1996
KHURAIJAM SOMOI SINGH Appellant
V/S
STATE OF MANIPUR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal against the conviction of the accused Shri Khuraijam Somoi Singh under Section 302 of the I.P.C. sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life passed by Sri Birendra Kr. Sharma, the learned Additional Session Judge, Manipur West, Imphal in Session Trial Case No. 6/91/1191 dated 20-6-1992.

(2.) Prosecution case is that the accused K. Somoi Singh committed the murder of his step-father A. Sarangkhomba Singh of Waikhong Laimanai village by assaulting the deceased with a Haothang (dao) and axe on the 3rd day of December, 1982 at about 12-40 p.m. just in the very house of the deceased. The murder was witnessed by the daughter of the deceased (P.W. 1) and the victim succumbed to injuries on the spot. Local people and police rushed to the spot and the accused was arrested alongwith the weapons. A case was registered on the complaint of the P. W. 1 and the police commenced investigation and on completion thereof, submitted a charge-sheet against the accused who in the due course was committed to the Court of Sessions to stand his trial. The prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses including the doctor and 3 (three) police officers. On behalf of the accused 2 (two) witnesses were examined. Dr. Narendra Singh (P.W. 11) held the post mortem examination on the dead body of A. Saranghomba Singh and proved the injuries in consequence of which A Sarangkhomba Singh had died. P.W. 1 to P.W. 7 are the witnesses to prove the murder. The plea taken by the defence was that of insanity. The accused, while under examination stated that he was totally unaware as to what he had done even he could not recollect how the deceased died, he however stated that he assaulted a man whom he saw as tiger.

(3.) The sole contention raised before us is that the accused was of unsound mind at the time when he went out, picked up the dao and dealt dao blows, he was incapable of knowing the nature of the acts or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. Indeed, nothing is an offence which is done by a person of unsound mind under the circumstances set out above. It is a general exception to the rule contained in Chapter IV of the Indian Penal Code. To bring a case within the ambit of S. 84, it is said the burden is on the prisoner. Insanity or unsoundness of mind is an exception to the penal law. The fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence is that an accused is presumed to be innocent and therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove all the essential ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. In a case of homicide as well as offence of causing hurt or grievous hurt the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the requisite intention or knowledge ingrained under S. 299, 326 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code. The burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. Section 84, Indian Penal Code provides an exception to the general rule contained in the Penal Code where the plea of the accused is unsoundness of mind which incapacitated his faculties to know the nature of his acts or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. This being an exception attracts S. 105 of the Evidence Act, which lays down the burden of proving the existence of the circumstances to bring the case within the said presumption and continue to presume the absence of the exceptional circumstances. However, S. 105 of the Evidence Act must be read along with the definition of the expression "shall presume" in S. 4 of the Evidence Act and the combined reading of both the Sections bring in for that the Court shall record the absence of the exceptional circumstances as proved, unless after considering the matters before it, the Court believes that the said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the case, would act upon the circumstances did exist. The presumption that such circumstances must be put forward by the accused. The material must be sufficient at least to make a reasonable person to believe the existence of the said circumstances probable and to act upon them. The materials may be oral evidence, documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or may stem from the prosecution evidence. The accused is to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Judge to ponder as to whether the accused had the requisite criminal intention describedin the S. 299 and/or other provisions of the Penal Code. If the Judge has a reasonable doubt he has to acquit the accused for in that event the prosecution will have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the accused. We are of the view that the rule of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity are : (a) that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the offence was committed by the accused that the requisite "mens rea" and the burden continues from the beginning till the end of the trial, (b) that it is a rebuttable presumption that the prisoner was not insane when he committed an offence in the sense set forth in S. 84, Indian Penal Code, (c) that the accused may rebut the presumption of sanity at the relevant time bringing the case within S. 84, I. P. C. by producing oral, documentary, circumstantial and other materials and he may discharge the burden by establishing a reasonable probable case. The accused is not called upon to establish the element of S. 84, IPC by producing evidence beyond reasonable doubt and (d) that even the accused fails to establish affirmatively or conclusively that he was of unsound mind and committed the act under the circumstances set out in S. 84, IPC but raises a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court as regards presence of essential ingredients of the offence, which of course includes, 'mens rea', the requisite criminal intention, the Court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged. We are also of the view that S. 6 of the I.P.C. is an extra ordinary provision which obligates the Court to consider whether case is covered by any of the exceptions under Chapter IV of the I.P.C., S. 6 of I.P.C., in our opinion, should read as a proviso to S. 105 of Indian Evidence Act. That apart, S.6 of the Code imposes statutory obligation on the Court to consider as to whether the case is covered by exception or not. The view that we have expressed is drawn from the decisions of this Court in Lohit Ch. Das v. State of Assam, (1986) 1 Gauhati LR 299, which is passed on certain decisions of the Apex Court in Dahyabhai Chaganbhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 : (1964 (2) Cri LJ 472); Ratan Lal v. State of M.P., AIR 1971 SC 778 : 1971 Cri LJ 654; Abdul Latiff v. State of Assam, 1981 Cri LJ 1205 (Gauhati) and Kumar Sunilal Deb v. State of Assam, (1981) 1 Gau LR 120 : (1982 Cri LJ NOC 29).