SATYEADRA KUMAR ROY Vs. KRIPAMAY MISHRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a revision by the first informant from an order of acquittal passed by Magistrate, 1st Class, Silchar in G.R. Case No. 594 of 1980 acquitting the Opposite pal ties of the charges under sections 447, 341 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The State Government did not prefer any appeal against the order of acquittal as it was a private dispute between the landlord and his tenant and the interest of public Justice did not require interference of the impugned order of acquittal.

(2.) The incident happened way back on 10.3.1980. The tenant Pulindra was erecting a fencing. He was a tenant of the petitioner. The tenant and his son claimed that the land fell within the area leased out to them whereas the first informant considered it to be a case of trespass, collected few labourers and went to the place. There was a skirmish between the tenant and his son on one side and the first informant petitioner on the other in consequence thereof the petitioner sustained simple injuries. Learned Magistrate held that the prosecution could not prove beyond reasonable doubt the allegation regarding trespass and wrongful restrain. He was in doubt as to whether the incident happened on the land leased out to the tenant or inside the land belonging to the first informant and acquitted the accused opposite parties of the charges u/s. 447 I.P.C. Under such situation it was difficult for the learned Magistrate to convict the accused of charges of causing voluntary hurt. Indeed if the first informant forcibly entered upon the land leased out to the tenant, the latter had the right to use the minimum force and oust the landlord. Learned Magistrate was also in doubt as to whether the landlord bad sustained the injuries as claimed by him.

(3.) This is a revision against an order of acquittal and it is therefore necessary to consider the contour of power of the High Court to interfere with the findings of acquittal reached by the trial court. The High Court is to exercise judicial discretion and act within the limit outlined by the Supreme Court. The revisional power can be exercised only in exceptional cases, where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of manifest illegality, or for the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice, vide D. Stephens v. Nosibolla1. It has been held therein that the power should not be exercised or invoked merely on the ground that the court below has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record. It has been ruled that the High Court cannot set aside an order of acquittal on reappraisal of the evidence, and, reverse the finding of fact on which the order of acquittal is based. Indeed the power of re-appreciation the evidence amounts to exercising appellate jurisdiction, which a party cannot invoke and the court cannot exercise in a revision. When there is glaring legal defect resulting in miscarriage of justice and where public justice requires interference to correct the manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice the court may interfere in such cases, vide Logendra Nath Jha v. Polailal Biswas2, Akalu Ahir v. Ram Dec Ram3. In Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarjo Singh4, it has been ruled that in dealing with the revision against an order of acquittal where the Government has not chosen to file an appeal the High Court should not reweigh and re-appreciate the evidence from its own point of view recharge conclusion contrary to those of the trial Court. The view finds support in Dhirendra Nath Mitra v. Mukund La15, Fakirchand Kamal Prasad6, Chaganti Kotiah7, Khetra Basi Samal8. It is, therefore, seen that when the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of manifest illegality, or for the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice the High Court should interfere. Similarly where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case but acquits the accused or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution desired to produce or where the appeal court bas wrongly held admissible evidence as inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court or where the acquittal is based on compounding of the offence, which is invalid in law, the High Court may exercise the jurisdiction.