LAWS(GAU)-1976-3-6

MONORANJAN SINHA Vs. BISHAMBORLAL SABOO, - COMPLAINANT-OPPOSITE PARTY

Decided On March 05, 1976
MONORANJAN SINHA Appellant
V/S
Bishamborlal Saboo, - Complainant -Opposite Party Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application under Section 561 -A read with Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, hereinafter to be referred as "the Code," for quashing a complaint case being Case No. 1384 -C of 1971 pending in the Court of Shri S.N. Rahman, Magistrate, Ist Class (Judicial) at Gauhati.

(2.) MR . J.P. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that in the instant case there is no question of appreciating the evidence but it is a case in which by merely looking at the complaint this Court is to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. The learned counsel submitted that the essential ingredients of the offence are absent in the present case and as such this is a fit case in which this Court should exercise its inherent power under Section 561 -A to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice.

(3.) THE learned Counsel Mr. Bhairab Chandra Sarma appearing on behalf of the Opp. party has argued the case at length. He has contended that this is not a fit case in which the proceedings should be quashed as there are enough materials to establish at least a prima facie case. He submits that at any rate the Magistrate was satisfied when he took cognisance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code and issued process in the instant case. He further submits that I should judge the criminal intent of the accused from his statement and conduct of 17.1.1969 i.e. the date on which the amount was paid by his client. The learned Counsel further submits that the subsequent conduct of the accused, namely, his issuing cheques on 17.4.1969 should also be taken into consideration by me in order to judge the criminal intent although the same is a subsequent event. Now let me, take up the question as to the scope and jurisdiction of this Court to quash a proceedings initiated on complaint the cognisance whereof was taken under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code and the process was issued only after the examination of the complainant under Section 200 of "the Code." (The statement so recorded shall be referred to as "the initial deposition"). In such a case, in my opinion, before quashing a criminal proceeding this Court should take into consideration not only the complaint but also the initial deposition in order to decide the crucial question as to whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. The complaint and the "initial deposition" were the foundations before the trial Court on the basis of which the proceeding was initiated. As such, I decide to take into consideration the complaint and also the initial deposition in order to dispose of the question as to whether the offence is disclosed or not. The jurisdiction to quash proceedings is very much there in Section 561 -A of the Code. But the crucial question is as to where and how the High Court can and should exercise this jurisdiction. This power should be exercised to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." The High Court should ordinarily be reluctant to interfere with criminal proceedings. But it is a settled law that even at an interlocutory stage the High Court should exercise its inherent power to quash such proceedings initiated on a complaint where the allegations contained therein and also in "the initial deposition" even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. The reason being that in such cases the question of appreciating evidence does not arise. In such cases the Court is only to peruse the complaint and "initial deposition" and to decide whether the offence alleged has been disclosed or not.