SRI MANIK CHAND PATOWA Vs. SRI SEKHAR ROY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard Mr. GN Sahewalla, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. R Jain for the petitioner and Mr.S Dey, learned counsel for the opposite party.

(2.) Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, the learned senior counsel submits that no application for setting aside abatement is necessary as the provision of Order XXII does not apply to a revision petition. Referring to Rule 11 of Order XXII , learned senior counsel would argue that the provision of Order XXII are applicable to suit, however, by Rule 11 thereof it has been extended to the appeals. There is nothing in Order XXII to show that it applies to a revision petition and so the same cannot be applicable. Under such circumstances, there is no question of abatement or limitation for setting aside abatement as well. In support of his contention he has placed reliance on a judgment of this court in the case of Lilaw ati Gupta & Ors ­vs - Union of India reported in 2004 (2) GLT 77. In paragraph -33 of the aforesaid judgment, this court made an observation that a revision does not stand on the same footing as an appeal inasmuch as an appeal is nothing but an extension of a suit. Since the provisions of Order XXII have been made applicable to a suit or an appeal and there can be no doubt about this, the provision of Order XXII cannot be extended to a revision. In so doing, reliance have also been placed in the case of Chandradeo Pandey ­vs - Sukhdeo Rai reported in (AIR 1972 Allahabad 504) . That is ajudgment of Hon'ble Three Judges of Allahabad High Court who have held the view that there is nothing in the Limitation Act to show that there is a fixed period for substitution of parties in a revision petition.

(3.) I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made on the basis of the judgment of this court in the case of Lilawati Gupta(supra) as well as the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Chandradeo Pandey (supra). In the aforesaid judgment of the Allahabad High Court, the Full Bench confined its consideration to the provisions of Limitation Act only. Since there is no mention of revision petition in the third Division under the Schedule of the limitation Act, the Full Bench was of the view that there was no period of limitation for substitution in the revision petition. In the case of Lilawati Gupta (supra) this court has merely relied on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in this regard and does not appear to have made any discussion as to whether a revision petition should be considered in the same footing as an appeal for the purpose of applying the provisions of Order XXII of the CPC. Perhaps some amount of deliberations is necessary in this regard. This is because under various statutes, revision petitions are preferred before this court as no appeal has been prescribed in the statute. For example, under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, only one appeal lies under Section 8 of the said Act but no further appeal lies there against. In view of the Full Bench Judgment of this court in the case of R.C.Basak ­vs -.D.N. Pandit reported in 1984 GHC 37(FJ) no second appeal lies against such appellate judgment as it is not provided for in the statute and so revision petitions are being filed challenging the judgments and decrees passed in appeal under the Act. In a given case, where the revision petition is allowed in favour of the Landlord and a judgment is passed for eviction of the defendant, in that event there is an eviction decree of the High Court which is required to be executed in accordance with law like any other decree of civil court.