AMIYA DEB LASKAR Vs. ASSAM BOARD OF REVENUE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY means of this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners have sought for quashment of the common Judgment and Order dated 11.10.1999 passed by the Assam Board of Revenue (for short, 'the Board') in Case Nos. 64MRA(C)/97; 65RA(C)/ 97 and 66RA(C)/97 by which three appeals preferred by the appellants/ petitioners herein were dismissed without interfering with the order dated 28.2.1997 passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Cachar (for short, 'the A.D.C) under Section 23 of the Assam (Temporarily Settled Areas) Tenancy Act, 1971 (for short, 'the Act').

(2.) THE basic grievance of the petitioners as projected herein is that though tenancy of the respondents under the petitioners was admitted, the Deputy Commissioner granted acquisition of ownership to the respondents under Section 23 of the Act without following the procedural law so prescribed under Rules 10,11 and 12 of the Assam (Temporarily Settled Areas) Tenancy Rules, 1972 (for short, 'the Rules') and as such the entire acquisition process as well as the ownership granted to the respondents were vitiated. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that one of the respondents was admittedly a Government servant who was not at all entitled to ownership under the prescribed law under Section 23 of the Act and even more surprisingly, enquiry so envisaged under the rules was not conducted by the authorities to arrive at a just and reasonable finding.

(3.) HAVING given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions so advanced on behalf of the parties and also upon impugned perusal of the materials available on record including the impugned judgment and order as well as order dated 28.2.1997 passed by the A.D.C. including the objection filed by the petitioners before the Deputy Commissioner (Annexure -1 to the writ petition), it appears that the petitioners before the Deputy Commissioner preferred objection stating that one of the respondents was a Government servant and that apart, the owners of the land were the widow and handicapped person, but consideration of that objection was not at all reflected in the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Even though the same was pleaded before the Board, the said authority also failed to consider that aspect of the matter. Rather, surprisingly, the Board recorded that there was no bar to a Government employee holding land as tenant when the Act itself puts clear embargo on holding the land by a person other than cultivator, the authorities also did not discuss anything as to whether the land was under personal cultivation of the respondents so as to have benefit of the definition of 'personal cultivation' as provided under Section 3(10) of the Act to the Government employee.