SAMATI DEB BARMA Vs. STATE OF TRIPURA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY this common judgment, we propose to dispose of the three appeals for more than one reason. Firstly, because though claims are multiple, the accident is singular and the claims arise out of the same and a singular accident. Secondly, a common point of law is involved in all these appeals bearing on the interpretation of Section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, for short ' the Act ', inserted by the Amendment Act No. 47 of 1982.

(2.) THE appellant in Appeal No. 27 of 1984 was permanently disabled as a result of the accident while in the other two appeals, the legal representatives of the deceased have come to this court. In one case, the deceased was Sadhan Debnath and in the other case Bishu Kumar Deb Barma, In both cases, the widows and other legal representatives of the deceased have appealed against the order rendered by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal on petitions under Section 92A which were rejected by a common order passed on April 30, 1984, in T. S. (Motor Accident) Case No. 33 of 1983 out of which Appeal No. 28 of 1984 arises in this court. Learned District Judge, West Tripufa, Agartala, acting as the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, rejected the claimants' petitions mainly on two grounds: (i) the deceased persons, Sadhan and Bishu, as well as the appellant, Pankhirai, were gratuitous passengers in that they were riding a ' police jeep ' which was not meant for carrying passengers ; and (ii) the accident which saw the death of Sadhan and Bishu and permanent disablement of Pankhirai was actually a collision between two vehicles and, therefore, the other offending vehicle which belonged to the Army Department was equally liable but the Union of India which owned the vehicle, was not made a party.

(3.) LET us now read the crucial provisions which deal with ' liability without fault ' which purport is made clear not only by the Chapter's caption but in the supplemental substantive provision enacted in Section 92B, which contemplates that the interim and instant relief sought to be provided under Section 92A was not in derogation of not only the remedy available under any other law but under any other provision of the Act itself. It is contemplated under Section 92B that the right to claim compensation under Section 92A in respect of death or permanent disablement shall be in addition to 'any other right', which right and its character, are also with great care and caution indicated within parenthesis by the Legislature stating 'hereinafter in this section referred to as the right on the principle of fault' to make the distinction clear. Before we refer to the language of Section 92A itself, we may at once say that the Legislature advisedly created a new liability 'without fault' in the new provision and this liability was, therefore, made limited as respects -the financial burden and also expressly specified as respects the persons burdened. There is no doubt, therefore, that this interim relief was sought to achieve a wholesome salutary purpose by providing the minimum instant relief to the needy and deprived, to the destitute, hapless and helpless who had become victims paradoxically of the advanced technology of the modern age. Needless to recall in this connection, the provisions of the hew Chapter came to be enacted as a response to judicial clamour for such a measure orchestrated at the highest level in more than one reported decision of the apex court reminding the State of its duties as a ' Welfare State ' to respond to pragmatic and humanitarian considerations.