LAWS(GAU)-1984-7-4

MAIPAK SINGH Vs. THAMBALANGOU SINGH

Decided On July 30, 1984
MAIPAK SINGH Appellant
V/S
THAMBALANGOU SINGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short point agitated in this application dates to the power of the revisional Court to quash the preliminary order passed under section 145(1) Cr. P.C. There is much substance in petitioners grievance that law has been mis-contrued on this point be the learned Sessions Judge. But, it is beyond dispute that this Court under section 401 Cr. P.C. must address itself to the wider questions affecting generally the rights of the parties without limiting its inquiry in revision to the validity of the decision given by the Court below on the law point involved in the case.

(2.) Before the learned Sessions Judge, Manipur, validity of orders passed on 2.6.81, 14.7.81 and 24.7.81 by the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate, Bisbenpur in, Criminal Case No. 33 of 1981 were challenged. Learned Sessions Judge, however, having held that the preliminary order passed on 2.6.1981 under section 14(1) Cr. P.C., being without jurisdiction all subsequent orders passed in the said proceeding automatically became invalid and in that view of the matter he allowed the revision. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. T. Bhubon Singh has rightly urged that the learned Sessions Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in discussing evidence as respects possession of the duties and thereby depriving the learned Magistrate of the jurisdiction vested in him under subsections (4) and (6) of section 145 Cr. P.c. to decide the question Learned counsel relied in this connection on the decision of this Court in Rahmat Alis easel. The scope of revisional Courts jurisdiction to interfere with an order passed under section ]45 Cr. P.C. was delineated by this Court in that case. It was further held that if the Magistrate was satisfied that there existed a dispute as to movable property which was likely to cause breach of the peace, it was his bounden duty to proceed under section 145(1) Cr. P.C and it was also had that the primary jurisdiction to arrive at the decision on rival claims in respect of possession vested in the Magistrate under section 135(4) Cr. P.C. which should not be usurped by the revisional court.

(3.) However, in this case what is forcefully and very capably urged by the learned counsel Mr. R.K. Sanajaoha Singh on behalf of the opposite parties is that the satisfaction of the Magistrate in drawing up proceeding under sub-section (1) of section 145 Cr. P. C has to be real satisfaction based on cogen and relevant material. If the satisfaction is vitiated, the preliminary order was liable to be quashed and the revisional Court does possess the jurisdiction to inquire into the satisfaction of the Magistrate by examining the material on which the satisfaction is arrived at. His submission is, in the instant case, there was no cogent material before the learned Magistrate to arrive at a real satisfaction by objectively appreciating the facts and circumstances and the materials placed before him to take action thereon. Mr. R.K. Sanajaoba Singh draws my attention to the impugned order dated 2.6.81, passed by the learned Magistrate and also to the police report on the basis of which the said order was passed referring to the said order, I find that in drawing up proceedings under section 145(1) Cr.P.C., the learned Magistrate explicitly stated that on the perusal of police report, it appeared to him that there existed a bonafide dispute between the parries over the question of possession of the disputed land and imminent breach of the peace was apprehended. It is further stated by him that the proceeding was commenced as recommended by the police. I may now refer to the police report in this case wherein it was stated that on 23.5.81, the police, on making spot enquiry, found as a matter of fact that some members of the Society (second party) were working on .the proceeding land. The police report referred to the petition filed by the first party and also traced the genesis of the so-called dispute. After giving my anxious attention to the narration of events made in the police report on this point it does not appear to nie that the so-called dispute was at all a dispute between the parties relating to the possession of the proceeding land. Indeed, in the application filed in the Court for drawing up proceeding, albeit not under section 145 Cr. P.C but under sections 107/144 Cr. P.C., on the basis of which the enquiry was made by the police, the grievance against the second party clearly manifested a challenge to their right to possess the proceeding land, and not a single word was stated therein about the first partys own possession of the suit land. In the said petition objection was taken against petitioners preparation to enter into the proceeding land on the basis of allotment order passed by the Government in their favour , which the first party has challenged before the Revenue Tribunal and it was stayed by the Tribunal . On a perusal of the petition dated 22.5.81 and the police report dated 26.5.81 on the basis of which the impugned order under section 145(1) Cr.P.C was passed ,I have no manner of doubt that the material which was before the learned magistrate when he passed under Section of imagination can be said to be such material as was germane to his assumption of jurisdiction thereunder.