RAM AKHAIBAT Vs. SRIKRISHNA PRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) What precisely has fallen for the consideration of this Bench is the interpretation of the term "reasonable improvements" to be found in S.5(1)(b) of the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955, for short the Act or 1955 Act. We may however quote the relevant provisions of both clauses of sub-s. (1) to appreciate the underlying legislative intent of the concerned provision and the term used therein. 5. Protection from eviction-

(2.) The instant appeal had come up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court on 25-2-1974 when the counsel for the appellant submitted that S.5(1)(b) of the Act did not exclude from the purview thereof a tenant who had effected "improvement by constructing a structure, whether permanent or temporary", on the tenanted land, whether within or beyond five years of tenancy; and the he was entitled to be paid compensation therefor in terms of the said provision. He relied on an unreported Bench decision of this Court rendered on 31-3-1959 in S.A. No. 130 of 1959 (Gayaram v. Kanhaiyalal) to support his contention but also submitted that it would be necessary for the Court to reconsider its decision reported in AIR 1966 Ass 118 (Mira Khumbi v. Usha Ranjan). Accordingly, the matter was listed for hearing before a larger Bench. On 2-4-1975, when the matter came up before a Division Bench, it was ordered that a Special Bench should hear the matter as the decision in Mira Khumbi was rendered by a Division Bench and the question was whether it required re-consideration. This is the genesis of this reference.

(3.) Respondents' counsel Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, contended before us that legislature having advisedly not defined the term "reasonable improvement" in the Act itself we may not embark upon this venture. However, he submitted, the term "improvement" which also the Act had not defined, needs an interpretation because S.6(b) precludes such an exercise only in respect of the term "reasonable improvement" by reserving to the Court making determination u/s.6 the right to interpret the terms. He also did not dispute that the decision in Mira Khumbi (supra) did say something on S.5(1)(b) of the Act which was perhaps not warranted on the facts and in the circumstances of that case. While pressing, though, for our acceptance the interpretation that the term "improvement" used in Cl.(b) of S.5(1) in the context and setting meant a permanent structure built by the tenant for which only he is entitled to claim compensation, learned counsel has fairly placed before us the cognate provisions of parallel enactments and relevant case-law on which he could lay hands. To assist the Court discharge objectively an onerous obligation, as the provision contains a wholesome piece of social legislation, Mr. Bhattacharjee took pains and we feel happy to record our appreciation of his noble effort.