PRADIP KUMAR DAS Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application for the issue of a writ in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing expunction of certain remarks made by the Magistrate, First Class, Barpeta, in his judgment in G. R. Case No. 462 of 1961 on 16 -6 -62.

(2.) THE portions in the judgment to which exception has been taken are set out in paragraph 10 of the petition, through which we have been very carefully taken. These portions merely contain the remarks of the Magistrate while assessing the weight and value to be attached to the evidence of one Pradip Kumar Das who figured as a prosecution witness in the case before the learned Magistrate. Apparently, the learned Magistrate was satisfied that the witness was not telling the truth and that he had also admitted to have misappropriated the funds of the Government sanctioned for the library and children's park, although he claimed in his evidence that the writing was extorted from him. On a careful consideration of these observations of the learned Magistrate we are not satisfied that they transgressed the limits of a careful and judicious appreciation of the evidence of the witness before the Magistrate. It is open to the fudge, before whom a witness appears, to consider the evidence of the witness and make to the best of his judgment, an assessment of the witness and his evidence and the value to be attached to it. If this privilege is denied then it would amount to undermining the judicial independence of judicial officers when exercising their judicial functions.

(3.) RELIANCE was also placed on a Single Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of Lacbman Das v. Jai Gopal, reported in 40 Cri LJ 214 : AIR 1938 Lah 793. The learned Judge who decided the case did take the precaution of pointing out that before any remarks are expunged from a judgment it must be found that those remarks were wholly unjustified in the circumstances of the case. It is unnecessary to examine this decision as the facts on which it is based were different. In any event, we are not satisfied that the remarks objected to in this case are either uncalled for or irrelevant. On the other hand, the learned Magistrate was entitled to come to a conclusion on the merits of the evidence given by the witness and make such comments as he considers to be justified. We see no reason to interfere in the exercise* of our inherent jurisdiction, which exercise has to be only confined to extreme cases as pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court.