AMRIT BALLAV GOSWAMI Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard Mr. B. D. Konwar, learned counsel for the petitioner detenue and Mr. S. AH, learned Addl. Advocate General, Assam for the respondent.

(2.) The order of detention was issued by the District Magistrate, Golaghat on 22.5.2003 ordering detention of the petitioner under the National Security Act, 1980. The order of detentiol. along with the grounds of detention has been served on the detenu, which received approval of the State Government on 27.5.2003. The detenue petitioner submitted representation challenging his detention on 29.5.2003, which has admittedly been received by the State Government on 6.6.2003. However, the representation was kept pending until 3.7.2003 when it was rejected by the State Government after 35 days.

(3.) Among other, the learned counsel for the detenu petitioner has submitted before us that the detention order having not specified the term of detention, cannot stand and is liable to be quashed. For the said purpose, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision in the case of Commissioner of Police and Others Vs. Gurbox Anandram Bhiryani, reported in (1988) Suppl. SCC 568, wherein the Apex Court in similar circumstance, while considering analogous provisions in Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act, 1981 (Act 55 of 1981), like the provisions in sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 has said The order is bad on another ground, namely, the period of detention has not been indicated by the detaining authority. The scheme of this Act differs from the provisions contained in similar Acts by not prescribing a period of detention but as Section 3 of the Act indicates, there is an initial period of detention which can extend up to three months and that can be extended for periods of three months at a time. It was open to the detaining authority to detain the detenu even for a period of lesser duration than three months. That necessitated the period of detention to be specified and unless that was indicated in the order, the order would also be vitiated. In scores of decisions this Court has been emphasizing the necessity of strict compliance with the requirements of the preventive detention law; yet authorities on whom the power is conferred have not been complying with the requirements and even if there is merit to support the order of detention, the procedural defects lead to quashing thereof as a result of which the purpose of the Act is frustrated and the suffering in the community does not abate.