MRS. KAWLHMINGLIANI Vs. MOTILAL CHETRI AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By the impugned order the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl (Mizoram) determined two preliminary questions. He allowed the prayer for amendment and permitted the plaintiff-opposite party to add his sister as Co-plaintiff. Secondly, learned Additional Deputy Commissioner decided issue No. 5, held that the suit, for the purpose of Court fees was correctly assessed under Sec. 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1970, rejecting the contention of the defendant-petitioner that the plaintiff was to pay Court fee as provided in section 7(v)(d) of "the Act" and relied in Batuk Chandra Patwari Vs. Kirti Ram Das, AIR 1972 Gauhati 69. Of course, this part of the order is non-speaking, but the reference of the decision just alluded is clearly indicative of the fact that learned Additional Deputy Commissioner decided that the suit was covered by section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act and did not attract section 7(v)(d) of "the Act."

(2.) Mr. S.R. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly conceded that he does not question the correctness of the order of amendment of the plaint permitting the plaintiff to add his sister as Co-plaintiff. However, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Additional Deputy Commissioner committed error in not directing the plaintiff to pay court fee under section 7(v)(d) of the Court Fees Act. Learned counsel submits that the plaintiff was to pay court fee on the market value of the land in view of the averments made in the written statement of the defendant-petitioner.

(3.) The question is no longer res integra. In a line of decisions it has been ruled that where the primary dominant purpose of the suit is for declaration and possession is merely consequential the suit is to be valued, for the purpose of court fees, under section 7(iv)(c) and the valuation for the pecuniary jurisdiction would be the same as provided in section 8 of the suit Valuation Act, 1887. It has been ruled in Satiappa Chettiar Vs. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245 that if the primary and dominant purpose of the suit is for declaration and possession or confirmation of possession is merely consequential, the amount of court fee can be evaluated by the plaintiff and the same must be accepted by the Court. In AIR 1979 Gauhati 27 (DB) Auekpam Biramangoi Singh Vs. State Bank of India, it has been laid down that a suit falling under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, the plaintiff is at liberty to value his suit for the reliefs sought by him and the Court has no power to interfere with the valuation assessed by the plaintiff in view of the obligatory directions contained in section 7 (iv)(c) of "the Act". It appears clear that the provisions of section 7(iv) give an unfettered discretion to the plaintiff to put any valuation without any check, breke or restriction provided the relief sought falls within the four corners of section 7(iv). It is obvious that the section has taken away the general power of the Court under Order 7 Rule 11(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure or the inherent power under section 151 of the Code, to interfere with such evaluation by the plaintiff. The general power and the inherent power of the Court stood modified by the special statutory provisions contained in section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act. Under these circumstances, when the plaintiff puts his valuation under section 7(iv), the court has no power to interfere with the plaintiff's valuation. The principles of Interpretation of Statutes do not permit reading of the expression "reasonable amount" or "but shall not be valued at an arbitrary low value" and/or any other rider in section 7(iv) of the Act. Even where the amount is unreasonably low or arbitrary, the court cannot interfere with the valuation set by the plaintiff. In absence of any amendment in the Court Fees Act or the Rules framed thereunder, the Court is powerless to intervene in the valuation of the relief put by the plaintiff in the cases covered by section 7(iv)(c) of "the Act". Under these circumstances, I am constrained to hold that the court could not have interfered with the valuation set by the plaintiff in a suit covered by section 7(iv)(c) of "the Act".