R. LALLAWANA Vs. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) EVERY detention without a trial almost puts the Court itself on trial when it is approached for redress. On the one hand it has to guard the cherished liberty of the individual, and on the other it has to see to the smooth functioning of the social order. When anything puts in jeopardy the security of the State, the Court has to approach the matter with still greater care and circumspection.

(2.) THE present is a case where the petitioner was detained to prevent him from engaging in activities. which are prejudicial to the security of the State. The impugned order was passed on 21 -7 -1982 and it came to be served on the same day along with the grounds leading to the above subjective satisfaction. We may set out the grounds. These read: -

(3.) AS to para 2, the first submission is that this would speak of non -application of mind by the detaining authority inasmuch as though the activities in question were regarded to have disturbed public order and endangered the security of the State, the order of detention came to be passed only to prevent the petitioner from acting prejudicially to the security of the State. It is, therefore, urged that though two objects of detention were mentioned in the grounds, the detaining authority ultimately stated about one of the objects only, which would show that it had not applied its full mind. Reference has been made in this connection to Bhupal Chandra v. Arif Ali : 1974CriLJ326 and Satyabrata v. : 1974CriLJ329 . In both these cases the order of detention was to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicially to the maintenance of public order. In the grounds, however, reliance was placed on threat to the security of the State. By going through the grounds it was found that some of them were indeed connected with the security of the State, while some were thought to have no rationale relation with public order. As the order was thus based on some ground having no rationale connection with the maintenance of public order, the detention order was set aside. As to the grounds relatable to the security of the State, it was observed that either the District Magistrate had no information of these grounds at the time of passing of the order, or if he had, he did not believe them to be factually correct and so did not base his order on them. It was, therefore, observed that them District Magistrate cannot now seek to buttress his detention order by those grounds because if he did not think it proper to rely on them while making the detention order, he cannot deploy them now as another string to the blow.