MEGHALAYA STEELS LTD Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Section 260 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, (in short, the IT Act) provides for appeal to the High Court from the order passed, in an appeal, by an appellate Tribunal and prescribes the procedure subject to which an appeal can be admitted for hearing. This apart, Section 260A also prescribes the procedure for disposal of an appeal if the High Court decides to admit the appeal. Whether an appeal, made under Section 260A of the IT Act, can be heard unless the High Court is satisfied that the appeal has raised substantial question or questions of law? If the High Court is satisfied that the appeal, made under Section 260A, has given rise to substantial question or questions of law, is it permissible, for the High Court to hear the appeal without formulating substantial question or questions, which, according to the High Court, the appeal has raised? When there is no statutory provision, in the IT Act, vesting the High Court with the power to review its decision rendered under Section 260A, is it permissible for the High Court to review its order by taking resort to its inherent power or in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction, because the High Court is a Court of record and the Court of record has a duty to keep, for posterity, its record correct, clear and in accordance with law, so far as, at least, procedural aspect of hearing of appeal, under Section 260A, is concerned? When a review petition is pending in the High Court, which has passed the order disposing of an appeal under Section 260A, whether it is possible by the other party to file special leave petition to the Supreme Court and if the special leave is allowed and regular appeal comes into existence, will pendency of appeal, in the Supreme Court, render the review petition, invariably, incompetent and infructuous or is there any situation, wherein the High Court can hear the review petition despite the fact that an appeal is pending in the Supreme Court and if the review petition is allowed by the High Court, will the appeal, pending in the Supreme Court, become legally incompetent and infructuous? Is there a difference between review of procedure resorted to by a court or tribunal, on the one hand, and a review on merit of an order if the error of law is apparent on the face of the record, on the other? If so, what is the difference between the two? These are some of the prominent questions, which have arisen for determination in these review petitions.

(2.) Considering the fact that all these five review petitions are based on same factual situation, the questions of law involved are same and, on the request, made by the learned counsel for the parties, all these review petitions have been heard together, we take up all these five review petitions for disposal by this common order.

(3.) We have accordingly heard Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, learned Senior counsel, for the review petitioner, in Review Petition No. 108/2010, and Mr. R.K. Agarwalla, learned Senior counsel, for the review petitioners in Review Petition Nos. 116/2010, 117/2010, 119/2010 & 124/2010. We have also heard Mr. K.P. Pathak, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, appearing on behalf of the opposite party in all the review petitions.