SHREE AUTOMOBILES PVT LTD Vs. COMMISSIONER OF TAXES

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The challenge in the present writ application is against a notice dated 23.9.93 issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Taxes,Guwahati Zone-C, under Section 36(1) of the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993 read with Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. By the aforesaid notice, suo motu revision of the assessment of the petitioner firm under the Central Sales Tax Act for the period ending 31.3.92 and 30.9.92 was proposed by the authority. The writ petitioner has come up before this court challenging the aforesaid notice by contending that the same has not been lawfully issued and therefore, would be open to appropriate interference by this court.

(2.) The facts of the case, in brief, may be recited herein below:- The assessment of the petitioner company in respect of its liability under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 for the two periods, in question were completed under Section 17(4) of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 read with Section 9(2) of the CST Act, 1956. The petitioner applied to the authority for cancellation of the aforesaid best judgment assessment and the Superintendent of Taxes i.e., the assessing authority, asked the petitioner to appear before him on 19.4.93 with full records of all transactions made in course of its business in respect of the periods in question. The petitioner complied with the said requirement imposed by the assessing authority and thereafter by an orders dated 19.5.93 & 20.5.93 the assessing authority re-assessed the petitioner-firm by invoking Section 17(3) of the Act of 1947 read with Section 9(2) of theCST Act, 1956. Thereafter, the impugned notice dated 23.9.93 was issued under Section 36(1) of the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993, which Act had come into force in the meantime w.e.f. 1.7.1993, giving rise to the challenge in the instant proceeding.

(3.) Dr. AK Saraf, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner has advanced a two fold argument in support of the challenge made in this writ petition. Learned counsel has argued that the assessments of the writ petitioner for the periods in question were made by the assessing authority after full scrutiny of the records produced and after due satisfaction of the turnover of the petitioner. The power of suo motu revision under Section 36( 1) of the Act of 1993 would not be available to revise the said assessment completed on the basis of the documents and records produced before the Assessing Officer, merely because the revisional authority, is of the view that the assessments have not been made correctly and properly. Learned counsel for the petitioner by relying on a judgment of this court in the case of Rajendra Singh-Vs- Superintendent of Taxes, (1990) 79 STC 10 (Gauhati) has contended that to enable the authority to exercise the power of suo motu revision conferred by Section 36(1) of the Act of 1993 two conditions have to be fulfilled, namely, the assessment/order is erroneous and prejudical to the interest of revenue. Learned counsel has argued that this court in the case of Rajendra Singh (supra) has interpreted the expression erroneous" to mean an error committed by the assessing officer in respect of his jurisdiction meaning thereby that either the assessment has been made without jurisdiction or the same has been made with material irregularity or illegality in exercise of jurisdiction. Learned counsel has further argued that an assessment/order passed by a lower authority may be erroneous in the context of the ordinary meaning of the said expression. However, the same would not make the assessment/order amenable to correction in exercise of suo motu power of revision unless an error of jurisdiction, i.e., a jurisdictional error had been committed. In the instant case, the assessments of the writ petitioner for the period in question were made after due scrutiny of the documents produced by the assessee pursuant to the requisitions made by the assessing officer. No jurisdictional error according to the learned counsel is disclosed in the assessments made so as to justify recourse to the provisions of Section 36(1) of the Act of 1993.