LAWS(GAU)-2003-7-43

RAMESH CHANDRA KALITA Vs. STATE OF ASSAM

Decided On July 23, 2003
RAMESH CHANDRA KALITA Appellant
V/S
STATE OF ASSAM Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE selection of the respondent No. 6 and his subsequent appointment as Principal of the Tezpur College sometime in the year 1998 is the subject -matter of challenge in the present proceeding.

(2.) THREE principal grounds have been urged by the learned counsel, Mr. P.J. Phukan, in support of the challenge made in the present writ application. Firstly, it has been contended that the selection was held on 19.1.1998 on which date there was a ban on selection and appointment. Such ban, it is stated, was in force till 31.3.1998. Next, it has been contended that the petitioner is Ph.D. having several published works to his credit. The Selection Board committed serious errors in preferring the 6th respondent instead of the writ petitioner. Lastly, it has been contended that the petitioner having been placed at Sl. No. 121 of the list prepared by the State Selection Board and the 6th respondent having been placed at Sl. No. 174, the aforesaid position could not have been altered in the subsequent selection process.

(3.) THE arguments and counter arguments advanced on behalf of the parties have been considered. The first two points urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner need not detain the Court. It is difficult to comprehend as to how an order of ban on appointment would vitiate a selection held during the period of such ban. Reference to the documents relied upon by the petitioner to show that there was a ban on selections also, on due consideration, reflect a mere desire of the Minister that no selection should also be held up to 31.3.1998. Such a desire of the Minister cannot partake the character of a policy decision so as to invalidate the instant selection. The second point urged has been settled a long catena of decisions. This court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution would certainly not like to convert itself into a super selection body. In any case, there is hardly any judicially manageable standards or norms to answer the question posed, i.e. which of the two is the better candidate. In such a case, the rule of prudence demands that the writ Court should stay away from any such adjudication.