NIREN SARMA Vs. STATE OF ASSAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PREVENTIVE detention is an anathema to the cherished concept of liberty enshrined in Art.21 of the Constitution, Nonetheless the framers of the Constitution made provision for the same in Art.22. It has therefore been regarded as a necessary evil. But evil as it is, its operation has to be kept confined to the strict requirements of the law, and if two views on a matter be reasonably possible, the one beneficial to the detenu has to be adopted. When the courts are confronted with cases of this nature, they have to keep in forefront the upholding of the cherished freedom of the individual as far as possible, of course, by not putting the larger public interest of in orderly society in jeopardy.

(2.) IN these two cases, the petitioners came to be detained in pursuance of orders passed by the learned District Magistrate, Sibsagar, on 28 -12 -1981 (in Civil Rule No. 9/82) after the Superintendent of Police had approached him by forwarding the history sheet (dossier). In the other case the detention order was passed on 30 -12 -1981 in pursuance to the history sheet made available on the same day. The history sheet as well as the grounds clearly show that these two detenus had inter alia participated in secret discussion held on 29 -11 -1981 on the eve of "Rasta Roka" programme scheduled on 30 -11 -1981. Thereafter it is alleged that the petitioners took part in a secret meeting held on 10 -12 -1981 which was to discuss about observance of civil disobedience movement on 14th and 15th December, 1981. The last activity attributed to them is what had taken place on 27 -12 -1981 when there were discussions about observance of 36 hours road blockade programme from 5 A.M of 31 -12 -1981 and 36 hours civil disobedience movement on 10th and 11th January, 1982 and imposition of "curfew" on 26 -1 -1982. On knowing about these reported activities of the petitioners, the District Magistrate passed the order of detenion to prevent them from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of essential supplies and services and public order.

(3.) IN assailing the impugned orders, Shri Bhattacharjee has urged inter alia that as the activities to prevent which the petitioners were detained have ceased to exist by the time the returns were filed, the grounds do no longer exist to keep the petitioners in continued detention. By referring to a large number of decisions, to wit, Naranjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 106 : (1952 Cri LJ 656); Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi, AIR 1953 SC 277 : (1953 Cri LJ 1113) In re Madhu Limaye, AIR 1969 SC 1014; and B. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Orissa, AIR 1971 SC 2197, it is urged that the material date in this connection is the date of return. In A.K. Gopalan v. Govt. of India, AIR 1966 SC 816 : (1966 Cri LJ 602), it was held that the detention on the date of the application has also to be legal if nothing more has intervened between that date and the date of hearing. In Kanu Sanyal v. Dist. Magistrate. Darjeeling, AIR 1974 SC 510: (1974 Cri LJ 465), it was observed that the date of return is the more accepted date in this regard though date of the hearing can also be regarded as relevant. As the returns had been filed in these cases after 26th January, 1982, Shri Bhattacharjee submits that the grounds of detention must be held to have spent their force by that time, Strong reliance has been placed by Shri Bhattacharjee in this regard on a Bench decision of this court in Samir Das v. The District Magistrate, Kamrup 1974 Assam LR 221 : (1975 Cri LJ 315), in which the order of detention was also to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of services essential to the community. But that was grounded on some speeches by the petitioner relating to indefinite strike with effect from 8 -5 -1974. But as by the time the return had been filed that period was over, this court held that the ground had become non -existent and being of this view the order was set aside.