LAWS(GAU)-1972-6-1

SIKARIA SONS AND COMPANY Vs. SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES

Decided On June 22, 1972
SIKARIA SONS AND COMPANY Appellant
V/S
SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS judgment will govern the four Civil Rules Nos. 214, 215, 216 and 217 of 1968. The facts of C. R. No. 214 alone may be noted.

(2.) THE petitioner No. 1 (briefly petitioner) is a registered firm under the Indian Partnership Act and runs a roller flour mill at Gauhati and the petitioner No. 2, one of the partners, manages the affairs of the firm. The Government supplies to the petitioner wheat in gunny bags and it has to mill the same in its mills and sell the wheat products to the allottees at a fixed price in the original gunny bags and the petitioner does not charge, any price for the bags. The petitioner filed a return of its turnover of this business for the period ending 30th September, 1965. The Superintendent of Taxes, Gauhati, made an order of assessment on 6th July, 1967, and the taxable turnover was assessed at Rs. 11,429. The Superintendent of Taxes on 11th November, 1967, issued a notice to the petitioner under section 19-A of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 (hereinafter called "the Act"), stating that from the information in his possession he had reasons to believe that during the return period ending on 30th September, 1965, its turnover in respect of sales of goods chargeable to tax escaped assessment to the tune of Rs. 97,830 being the value of the containers of the wheat products. The petitioner objected to the notice as illegal and without jurisdiction, but all the same submitted a return showing nil turnover under protest. This has led to this application under article 226 of the Constitution and the petitioner obtained the present rule on 5th July, 1968, and the operation of the impugned notice of 11/13th November, 1967, was stayed.

(3.) WE will take up the submissions of Mr. Lahiri in the order they are made. Mr. Lahiri addressed us on the third point first and did not choose to argue the fifth point at this stage of the matter in this proceeding, reserving his right to take up the point, if necessary, at a future time. According to him, section 19-A (1) and section 19-A (2) should be read and considered as an integral whole. He contends that under section 19-A (2), if the word "commissioner" is substituted by the word " Superintendent", that sub-section becomes unworkable. According to him, in that case, the Superintendent may authorise any person appointed under section 8 to assist him, namely. Superintendent, in investigating any case. He points out that under section 8, the State Government may appoint a Commissioner of Taxes and such other persons to assist the said Commissioner of Taxes as it thinks fit. The State Government, therefore, is not competent under section 8 (1) to appoint any persons to assist the Superintendent. Thus, since under section 19-A (2), it is inconceivable to give the power under that section to the Superintendent, necessarily the power under section 19-A (1) cannot be exercised by the Superintendent, who is not specifically mentioned in the sub-section. If the word "commissioner" is read for what it stands for both in section 19-A (1) and in section 19-A (2), there will be no anomaly, says Mr. Lahiri. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that on this interpretation the notice by the Superintendent in this case is illegal and without jurisdiction.