BASANTA KUMAR BAISHYA Vs. DEPUTY SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM, PANCHAYAT AND C. D. (A) DISPUR AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner is an elected representative of the people. He is (or was before he was suspended) the Chief Executive Councillor (C.E.C.) of the Gauhati Mahkuma Parishad. His suspension on 27-3-81 has brought him to the court with the grievance that this has been done without the authority of law and in violation of the principles of natural justice. As we are dealing with a body which is a part and parcel of the Panchayati Raj, which was assured to the people of India by its national leaders, I am reminded that this court owes an obligation under Art. 37 of the Constitution of India to so interpret the provisions of the concerned statute, which may further and not hinder the goals set out in the Directorate Principles. It was stated in U. P. State Electricity Board Vs. Harishankar, AIR 1979 SC 65 : (1978 Lab IC 1657) , that Art. 37, addressed to the courts, means that while courts are not free to direct the making of legislation, they are bound to affirm and adopt principles of interpretation in the light of Directive Principles. Art. 40 of our Constn. does require the State to organise village panchayats and to endow them with powers to enable them to function as units of self-government. It is axiomatic that the persons in charge of Panchayats should also be allowed reasonable amount of autonomy. Of course, it cannot be permitted to run riot.

(2.) Shri Baruah, who has addressed the court on behalf of the petitioner, has advanced many contentions. Some of these I would regard as fringe submissions; two are nearer to the core and one lies at the heart of the matter. To appreciate these contentions, we have to read the order in full:

(3.) The fringe submissions may be taken up first. It is urged that the power which has been conferred by S. 25(3) of the Act is to pass an order to say that the concerned person is to "vacate his office forthwith." As against this, power of suspension is available pending removal of the persons named in sub-sec. (4). Thus, the grounds on which a person could be ordered to vacate his office under sub-sec. (3) are not the same when action under sub-sec. (4) is taken, which speaks of removal. By referring to the predecessor Act (The Assam Panchayat Act, 1959), it is urged that S. 27(2) of that Act had specifically given power of removal, whereas the terminology in the Act is different. The learned counsel here is merely playing with words. To say that asking to vacate is different from ordering removal would make the power of suspension given by sub-sec. (4) completely otiose, as the Act has not conferred this power of removal by any other provision. On the other hand, S. 25(4) of the Act itself makes it clear that the grounds mentioned in sub-sec. (3) are relatable to removal of the person concerned. This is apparent from the concluding portion of sub-sec. (4). When a person is ordered to vacate his office, he is definitely removed from that office. As I do not entertain any doubt on this score, I have not thought it fit to either examine the dictionary meaning of the words "vacate" and "removal", or to refer to case law whether marginal note of a section can be used as a guide to find out the meaning of a provision.