SOHBAR SIRDARSHIP ELAKA Vs. STATE OF MEGHALAYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The sole question which falls for consideration in this writ petition is, whether the writ petition is barred by the principle of laches. The undisputed facts material for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition may be recorded straightaway. The elders, Sirdars and inhabitants of the Sohbar Sirdarship had entered the agreement dated 29-10-1892 with the Agent of the erstwhile Governor General of India, who was then representing the East India Company. By this agreement, the people of the Sohbar Sirdarship divided the share of the limestone production in the Sirdarship and allowed the East India Company to receive 50% of the royalty while the remaining 50% was reserved for payment to the people of Sohbar Sirdarship itself as consideration for exploiting/extracting the limestone deposited in the Sirdarship. On 29-5-1940, the then Provincial Government of Assam entered into an agreement with the Assam Bengal Cement Company Ltd. for extraction of the limestone in the Sirdarship. This company thereafter started extraction of the limestone in the Sridarship. The Provincial Government of Assam had since then been paying 50% of the royalty to the Sohbar Sirdarship in accordance with the agreement dated 29-5-1940 till 1952 when this Provincial Government stopped the payment. In the year 1971, the State of Meghalaya came into being with the coming into force of the North Eastern Areas (Reorganization) Act, 1971. On 25-6-1973, the State of Meghalaya entered into a Mining Lease Agreement with the Komorrah Limestone Mining Company Ltd. whereby 50% royalty came to be paid to the District Council instead of paying it to the Sohbar Sirdarship.

(2.) Aggrieved by the non-payment of the royalty to the Sirdarship, the petitioner filed W.P.(C) No. 42(SH) of 1991 before this Court, which by the judgment and order dated 25-5-1995 had allowed the writ petition and directed the State-respondents to pay the royalty of 50% to the petitioner in terms of the agreement dated 29-10-1829 read with Article 294 of the Constitution of India. Aggrieved by this judgment and order, the District Council carried the matter in appeal before the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 20(SH) of 1999. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the then counsel appearing for the petitioner, without instruction from the Sohbar Sirdarship, made a prayer before this Court for allowing him to withdraw the writ petition notwithstanding the adjudication of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge of this Court in favour of the petitioner. In terms of this prayer, the Division Bench of this Court by the order dated 6-12-2007 dismissed the writ petition with a liberty to file a fresh case and accordingly closed the writ appeal as infructuous. It is the case of the petitioner that as Sirdarship could not file a review petition of the order closing the appeal due to delay, he is now approaching this Court for appropriate relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(3.) Mr. HL Shangreiso, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the writ petition does not suffer from laches inasmuch as the grievance projected by the petitioner in this case is a continuing wrong or recurring wrong inasmuch as it creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the wrong responsible and liable. According to the learned counsel, continuing wrong is based on recurring cause of action and not one time action: the petitioner is not aggrieved by one time action of the State-respondents but with the continuous exploitation of its mineral resources and the continuous deprivation of the royalty legitimately due to it under the agreement dated 29-10-1829 and the provisions of the Mineral and Mines Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. In any case, argues the learned counsel, no third party right has been created in the meantime, which is a valid and relevant ground for overlooking the principle of laches. He also contends that the Division Bench of this Court in the writ appeal granted the petitioner the liberty to file a fresh case and the writ petition may not, therefore, be dismissed at the threshold and may be heard on merit in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience. To fortify his contentions, the learned counsel relies on the following decisions of the Apex Court:-