NIPAMACHA SINGH Vs. SECRETARY MANIPUR LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The thirty two writ petitioners who are members of the Seventh Manipur Legislative Assembly gave a notice dated 18-11-2000 to the Secretary of the Manipur Legislative Assembly of their intention to move a resolution for removal of the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly. The respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 who are also members of the Seventh Manipur Legislative Assembly also appear to have signed this notice dated 18-11-2000. But the Speaker rejected the motion for his removal on technical grounds and a bulletin was issued on 5-12-2000 by the Secretary of the Manipur Legislative Assembly informing all concerned about the rejection of the said motion. Aggrieved by the said rejection of the motion for removal of the Speaker, the petitioners have filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly rejecting the motion for his removal and for compelling the respondents by a writ of Mandamus to perform their duties as enjoined by the Constitution of India and the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Manipur Legislative Assembly. The petitioners have also prayed for appropriate directions for getting rid of the sine die adjourment and for early sitting of the House.

(2.) Mr. Nilomani Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that under Article 179(c) a Speaker of the Legislative Assembly may be removed from his office by a resolution of the Assembly passed by a majority of all members of the Assembly. The first proviso to Article 179 of the Constitution, however, provided that no resolution for removal of the Speaker from his office shall be moved, unless at least fourteen days notice has been given of the intention to move the resolution. He submitted that the majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly thus had a Constitutional right to remove the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly from his office and in accordance with such Constitutional right, the majority of the members of the Manipur Legislative Assembly had served a notice of fourteen days of their intention to move resolution for removal of the Speaker, but the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly has frustrated the said Constitutional right of the majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly by rejecting the said motion for his removal on technical grounds. He submitted that Rules 307, 308, 309 and 310 in Chapter XXII of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Manipur Legislative Assembly provided specifically for removal of Speaker from office. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 307 provided that a member wishing to give notice of a resolution under clause (c) of Article 179 of the Constitution for removal of the Speaker shall do so in writing to the Secretary and sub-rule (3) of Rule 307 further provided that on receipt of such notice, a motion for leave to move the resolution shall be included in the list of business in the name of the member concerned on a date fixed by the Speaker. Thus, the Speaker should have included in the list of business the motion for leave to move the resolution after fourteen days from the date of receipt of the notice dated 18-11-2000. Instead of including the said motion for leave to move the resolution in the list of business, the Speaker rejected the motion on technical grounds. According to Mr. Nilomani Singh, the Speaker cannot resort to his powers under the general provisions in Rules 127, 130, 336, 352 and 353 for rejecting any motion because the said Rules 127, 130, 336, 352 and 353 do not apply to a motion for removal of the Speaker, and only the provisions of Rules 307, 308, 309 and 310 apply to resolution for removal of the Speaker. He cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kr., (1984) 4 SCC 27 : (AIR 1984 SC 1543), for the proposition that where under a specific provision a particular subject has received special treatment, such special provision will exclude the applicability of any general provision. He also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Mizoram v. Biakchhawna, (1995) 1 SCC 156 : (1995 AIR SCW 1497) in support of his submission that when a statute requires an action to be taken in a particular manner, the same has to be taken in that manner. He argued that a notice given by a member of the Manipur Legislative Assembly to move a resolution for removal of the Speaker can only be dealt with in a manner provided in Rules 307, 308, 309 and 310 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business and no other manner. He further submitted that while rejecting the motion for his removal, the Speaker has not indicated any reason whatsoever and has vaguely stated that the motion is rejected on technical grounds. Such rejection of the motion for removal of the Speaker without reason is arbitrary and on this ground the impugned order of rejection is liable to be quashed. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, (1979) 1 SCC 405 : (AIR 1978 SC 851) wherein it was held that when a statutory functionary makes an order on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Mr. Nilomani Singh contended that since the order of the Speaker rejecting the motion to remove him from office was violative of the Constitutional rights of the petitioners and was arbitrary, this Court should quash the said impugned order and direct that a motion for leave to move the resolution for removal of the Speaker from office shall be included in the list of business of the House.

(3.) Mr. Ashok Potsangbum, learned counsel appearing for the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly, on the other hand, submitted that the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Manipur Legislative Assembly are not law and are, therefore, not enforceable. Thus, no writ or direction can be issued by this Court that a motion for leave to move the resolution be included in the list of business in accordance with sub-rule (3) of Rule 307 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business. He further submitted that the petitioners have also prayed in the writ petition for appropriate direction for getting rid of sine die adjournment and for early sitting of the House but under Article 174 of the Constitution, it is only the Governor who has been vested with the power to summon the House and this Court cannot direct summoning of the House. He explained that in the disturbances that took place on 2-12-2000 soon after the House was adjourned sine die, there was extensive damage to the House and the Government has been requested to provide the necessary funds for repairing the damage, but the Government has not been co-operating in the matter as would be clear from Annexures X 8, X 9, X 10 and X 11 to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. He stated that as soon as the damage to the House is repaired the Speaker will take steps for sitting of the House. Mr. Potsangbum submitted that under clause (2) of Article 212 of the Constitution, no officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under the Constitution for regulating Procedure or the Conduct of Business or for maintaining order in the Legislature is subject to jurisdiction of any Court in respect of exercise by him of those powers. He argued that the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly who has exercised his powers under the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business and rejected the motion for his removal on technical grounds is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of exercise of such powers and the writ petition was not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution. He cited the decision of the Orissa High Court in Saradhakar Supakar v. Speaker, Legislative Assembly, AIR 1952 Orissa 234, in which it was held that Article 212 of the Constitution operates as a bar to the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution against the Speaker of the Assembly on a matter relating to conduct of the business of the Assembly. He also relied on decision of the Orissa High Court in Godavaris Misra v. Nandakisore Das, AIR 1953 Orissa 111, in support of his submission that the immunity of the Speaker in respect of actions taken by him in exercise of powers conferred by the Rules extends to not only the procedure and conduct of business in the House, but to Procedure and Conduct of Business which deal with proceeding in the legislature. He also relied on Harendra Nath Barua v. Dev Kanta Barua, AIR 1958 Assam 160, in which the Court did not entertain a challenge to order of the Speaker on the ground that the procedure adopted by the Speaker was irregular. He cited the decision of Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in J. Singh Rathi v. State of Haryana, AIR 1970 Punjab and Haryana 379, in which it was observed that the power of the Speaker to regulate the procedure or the conduct of business in the House or for maintaining order in the House it is immune from the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 212 of the Constitution. He cited the decision in MSM Sharma v.Dr. Sri Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395, in which the Supreme Court left to the discretion of the Speaker of the House of Legislature to determine whether the subject matter of motion is or is not a specific matter of recent occurrence. He relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in MSM Sharma v. Dr. Sri Krishna, Sinha, AIR 1960 SC 1186, that the validity of the proceedings inside the Legislature of a State cannot be called in question on the allegation that the procedure laid down by law had not been strictly followed and no Court can go into those questions which are within the special jurisdiction of the Legislature itself, which has power to conduct on its own business. He referred to the decisions of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in KA Mathialagan v. P. Srinivasan, AIR 1973 Mad 371, in which the settled law that the House of Commons is not responsible to external authority for following its rules has been taken note of. He contended that the Speaker had extensive powers under Rules 127, 130, 336, 352 and 353 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Manipur Legislative Assembly to consider and reject the motion and Rule 354 of the said Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business provided that no decision of the Speaker in respect of disallowing of any resolution or question or or in respect of any other matter shall be questioned. He relied on the observations of the Allahabad High Court in AJ Faridi v. Chairman, U. P. Legislative Council, AIR 1963 All 75, that Article 183 of the Constitution and other corresponding Articles of the Constitution laid down restrictions on the moving of resolution for removal of the Presiding Officer but they are not the only conditions to which such a resolution may be subject and the Rules of Procedure may provide for further restrictions. He submitted that in addition to the conditions imposed by Article 179 of the Constitution, the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business may put other conditions and restrictions for the removal of the Speaker, and the Speaker can reject the motion for his removal from office, if such motion does not satisfy such other conditions and restrictions prescribed by the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business. He argued that the notice dated 18-11-2000 of the petitioners for moving a resolution for removal of the Speaker contained allegations and charges against the Speaker which were not admissible and the Speaker had the power under Rule 130 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business to disallow the motion as not admissible. He submitted that the first step for removal of a Speaker is a notice of an intention of a member to move a resolution for removal of a Speaker and at this stage the notice did not require to specify allegations and the charges against the Speaker and yet in notice dated 18-11-2000 grave and serious allegations and charges were made against the Speaker and thus the Speaker rejected the motion on technical grounds. He submitted that there are precedents in Manipur Legislative Assembly and in Lok Sabha to show that motions for removal of Speaker have been rejected on such technical grounds. Mr. Potsangbum finally submitted that the representation dated 21-12-2000 annexed to the reply affidavit of the petitioners would show that the petitioners have taken their grievance against the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly to the President of India. He contended that since the matter is under the consideration of the President of India, this Court should dismiss this writ petition.