CHOWTEMAL SHARMA Vs. HIRALAL PATNI AND 2 ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application under Art. 134(c) of the Constitution of India for a certificate to the effect that the case which was disposed of by a final order of this Court dated the 21st August, 1950, is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. In the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, criminal proceedings initiated on a complaint by the present Petitioner in the Court of a Magistrate at Gauhati (in Assam) were quashed at the instance of one of the three accused (Hiralal Patni) in the case. We came to the conclusion that the dispute arose out of a contract. The parties were at issue on several complicated questions of fact and law, the decision of which involved a very elaborate and prolonged inquiry. It was found that the Civil Court was the proper forum for the decision of these questions. The case was regarded as one of an exceptional nature and this was apparent from a bare recital of the two conflicting versions in the case. It was further found that the complaint did not disclose any criminal offence either under sec. 417. I. P. C. nr under secs. 6 and 7 of the Merchandise Marks Act. An explicit statement that the three accused were personally liable for applying or getting applied false marks did not appear in the complaint or the statement that followed. There was no allegation that the contract was entered into personally by the three accused and they had any criminal intent to cheat or defraud at that time. Several factors pointing to the absence of good faith on the part of the complainant in instituting the complaint were also noticed and the proceedings pending 111 the Court of the Magistrate were quashed against all the three accused.

(2.) A certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal to their Lordships of the Supreme Court has been prayed for on several grounds contained in the petition. At the hearing, the learned Advocate crystallised these grounds into one contention. He urged that the order of this Court quashing the proceedings, which had hardly begun, was vitiated by an error of law. He argued that the complainant should have been permitted to adduce evidence in support of the allegations made by him in the complaint and the quashing of the proceedings before such an opportunity was afforded to him was not in consonance with law. In support of this contention he relied on Varumal Lahrumal v. Emperor (1933 Sind. 169) and Amirbux v. Emperor (1934 Sind 183). No other point was pressed in support of the prayer for a certificate.

(3.) AS early as 1887, Lord Watson in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in In re Abraham Mallory Dillet (12 A C. 459 1887) observed that "Her Majesty will not review, or interfere with, the course of criminal proceedings unless it is shown that by a disregard of the forms of legal process, or by some violation of the principles of natural justice, or otherwise, substantial or grave injustice has been done" The principle enunciated was adhered to in substance till 1946. It is not necessary to refer to all the cases bearing on the point. It would be enough for the purposes of this case to refer to three important cases stating the rule of practice that their Lordships of the Privy Council always kept in view. In Tabu Singh v. King -Emperor (1925 P. C. 59), the Board refused to accept or share the responsibility for the administration of criminal justice in India unless there was some violation of the principles of natural justice or some disregard of legal principles. In 1932, Lord Dunedin in delivering the judgment of their Lordships in Mohindar Singh v. Emperor (1982 P. C. 284) gave a very emphatic expression to the principle. He observed that "there must be something so irregular, or so outrageous as to shake the very basis of justice." In 1946, Lord Porter, relying on the observations of Lord Watson in In re Abraham Mallory Dillet (12 A C. 459 1887), observed, in Malak Khan v. Emperor (1945 P. C. 16), "that the Privy Council would not review or interfere with the course of criminal proceedings, unless it was shown that by a disregard of forms of legal process or otherwise substantial or grave injustice had been done. When neither of these are present, the Privy Council will not interfere on the ground that the evidence was wrongly valued or was not sufficient to justify the conclusion reached."