LAWS(GAU)-2010-1-30

SILCHAR COLLEGIATE SCHOOL Vs. SHANTA DUTTA

Decided On January 27, 2010
SILCHAR COLLEGIATE SCHOOL Appellant
V/S
SHANTA DUTTA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD Mr. N. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Ms. P. Chakraborty, learned counsel, for the respondents.

(2.) AGGRIEVED by an order, passed by the Silchar Collegiate School, i.e., the petitioner No. 1 herein, and the authorities of the said school, suspending the respondent's service, while she was working as a teacher, in the said school, the respondent instituted Title Suit No. 32/2009, wherein she sought for, inter alia, relief of a decree declaring that her suspension was illegal. The ground on which such a challenge was posed to the order of suspension is not necessary to be discussed in this case. What is, however, important to note is that in her suit, the respondent also made an application, under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking temporary injunction restraining the principal defendants from further proceeding with the charge sheet, dated 02.04.2008, and letter of defendant No. 2, dated 20/11/2008, in making enquiry against the plaintiff-petitioner on the basis of reports of the defendant-opposite party No. 3, namely, the Assistant Head Master, Smt. Manjula Kar, Asstt. Teacher or otherwise, till final dispose of the suit. This application gave rise to Misc. (J) Case No. 39/2009. After institution of the suit, the respondent's service was terminated by an order, passed by the school authorities, on 10/3/2009.

(3.) HENCE, when, in the suit, the order of termination does not stand challenged, no relief against the termination of service of the plaintiff can, at this stage, be granted, in the suit, to the plaintiff. Consequently, no relief, by way of interim measure, such as, an order of injunction, can be passed or could have been passed by the learned trial Court unless the plaint was properly amended putting to challenge the said order of termination of the petitioner's service and unless upon such challenge being posed, the termination of service was prima facie found to be illegal and interferable by the Civil Court.