PRITHI SINGH Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioners Prithi Singh, aged about 50, a trader of Imphal, and P. Komol Singh, a truck driver, aged about 22, also of Imphal, were convicted by the A.D.M., Manipur, under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, read with Clause 3 of Manipur Foodgrains (Movement) Control Order, 1956, (which the A.D.M. has wrongly referred to as the Manipur Foodgrains Act, 1956, in his judgment and charges framed against the accused persons) for attempting to export rice and 'chira' outside Manipur State (now the Union Territory of Manipur). Prithi Singh was sentenced to R. I. for one year, and a fine of Rs. 1,000/ - while the other petitioner was sentenced to undergo R. I. for nine months. Out of the other two persons tried jointly with the petitioners for abetment of the offence, one was acquitted, by the A.D.M. and the other by the Sessions Court on appeal, but the convictions and sentences of the petitioners were maintained by the Sessions Court. They have therefore come up to this Court with this petition in revision. The foodgrains, consisting Order 46 bags of rice and 5 bags of chira were forfeited to the Government.

(2.) THE facts briefly stated, and as far as they are relevant for the purpose of this petition in revision are that Order 5 -3 -1957 at about 9 -30 a.m. petitioner Prithi Singh, the owner of the foodgrains, and Komol Singh, the other petitioner were caught at the Check Post at Mao, which is on the border between Manipur and Assam, but within the territory of Manipur, by the S.D.C. carrying the food -grains in a truck which was being driven by Komol Singh, petitioner. They had no permit to take the grain outside Manipur, as required by the said order Order 1956. The, S.D.C. handed over the matter to the Police, who launched the prosecution after investigation. The grain was also seized.

(3.) : [1954]1SCR803 was a case under the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, 1953, which sought to regulate and control the business in coal by the grant of licenses, and Clause 4(3) of that order gave the Licensing Authority unlimited power to grant, refuse to grant, renew or refuse to renew a licence and also to suspend, cancel or revoke or modify a licence granted or any terms thereof. Their Lordships held that sub -clause, as void because it imposed an unreasonable restriction upon the freedom of trade and business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, and not coming within the protection afforded by Clause (6) of the Article. The observations of their Lordships on this point contained in paragraph 8 of the judgment were as follows: