MILAN RANI DEVI Vs. SUSHIL ROY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) We have heard Mr. K.N. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. A. M. Lodh, learned senior counsel for the respondents.

(2.) Learned Advocate for the appellant places reliance on the following two decisions, (i) 1999 (5) SCC 645, Ubaiba, appellant - vs- Damodaran, respondent and (ii) AIR 1993 SC 1616, Rukmini Amma Saradamma, Appellant -vs- Kallyani Sulbchana and others, respondents, where the Supreme Court was considering Section 20 of the Kerela Rent Control Act, which is in parameteria with Section 22 of the Tripura Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975. The Supreme Court in that case in paragraph 21 pointed out as follows :

(3.) To the same effect is the decision reported in 1999(5) SCC 645, the Supreme Court in paragraph 3 pointed out as follows :- "3. Mr. K. Sukumaran, the learned senior counsel apeparing for the appellant contended that however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under the Act in question may be, but it cannot have jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority and therefore the impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable in law. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on a decision of this court in the case of Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochaita where under the selfsame provision of the Kerela Act was under consideration. This court after noticing the word "Propriety" used in Section 20 came to the conclusion that the approach of the High Court was totally wrong and even the wider" language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act az a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. The court also further observed "even by the presence of the word 'propriety' to cannot mean that there could be any reappreciation of evidence." The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the aforesaid decision will have no application to the case in hand where the dispute involved relates to a jurisdictional fact and according to the learned counsel where the dispute is in relation to a jurisdictional fact there should not be any fetter on the power of the revisional court even to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion. On being asked to support the aforesaid proposition no authority could be pdaced though on first principle learned counsel for the respondent argued as aforesaid. Having examined the rival submission and having gone through the decision of this court referred to earlier we are of the considered opinion that though the revisional power under the Rent Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding the use of the expression "Propriety" in Section 20, the revisional court therefore will not be entitled to reappreciate ' the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court in the light of the aforesaid ratio of this court it is crystal clear that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. In the circumstances, the impugned revisional order of the High Court is wholly unsustainable and we set aside the same and the order of the appellate authority is affirmed. The controller would now determine the quantum of rent, as directed by the appellate authority. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs."