SATYABRATA MAJHI Vs. STATE OF ORISSA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner has come up with this petition Under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the proceeding of 2(b) C.C. No. 1 of 1999 of the Court of JMFC (Paradeep), Kujanga and the order (Annexure -5) passed in the said proceeding on 11.2.1999 refusing to release the trawler of the petitioner seized in the aforesaid case for an offence Under Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.

(2.) THE petitioner is the owner of the trawler named as 'Mahapurusa' bearing registration No. OCM (T) 207 with Ashok Leyland Engine No. A.L. 11799. He has also been granted with the licence by the A.D.F., Marine, Kujanga under the Orissa Marine Fishing Regulation Act, 1982 for operating the trawler as a fishing vessel. According to the petitioner, while his trawler was engaged in fishing beyond the prohibited area as notified in Schedules -A and B of the notification dated 27.9.1997 (Annexure -1) issued by the State Government in Forest and Environment Department, the Forest Range Officer, Kujanga directed the crewmen to pull out the net from the water and finding that two Olive Ridley Turtles were in the not along with the fishes, seized the trawler and net etc. and arrested the crew members and got some papers signed by them forcibly.

(3.) IN this case the prayer of the petitioner is to quash the proceeding as well as the impugned order, wherein the learned JMFC has refused to release the seized trawler in favour of the petitioner. Before adverting to record the finding, it is considered expedient to state the laws as laid down by the apex Court relating to the exercise of inherent power Under Section 482, Cr.P.C. or exercise of extraordinary power under Articles 226 of the Constitution, by the High Court. (a) In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab : AIR I960 Supreme Court 866, the appellant moved the High Court of Punjab Under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for quashing the proceeding initiated by the first information report in question. During the pendency of that petition before the High Court, police submitted report Under Section 173 of the Code. Subsequently after hearing the parties, the petition was dismissed with the observation that no case has been made out for quashing the proceeding Under Section 561 -A. Being aggrieved by the said Court, considering the law laid down in the earlier cases, held as follows : '............ It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to law down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged, in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the Criminal Court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under the category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction Under Section 561 -A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court Under Section 561 -A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point........' In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. reported in AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604, the apex Court observed as follows : 'In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Articles 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do nto disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non -cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code.