(1.) The notices issued by the Notified Area Council, Paradip (opposite party No. 1) under different provisions of the Orissa Municipal Act levying the demand which have been annexed as Annexure-5 series are sought to be quashed in this writ application filed at the instance of the Paradip Port Trust. In fact, under Annexure-5 series, levy has been made towards holding tax on the buildings of the petitioner situated within the Notified Area Council. The main plank of the petitioner's argument is that the property in question belongs to the Union of India and, therefore, exempted from all taxes imposed by either the State of any authority within the State, under Art.285(1) of the Constitution of India. The stand of the Notified Area Council, on the other hand, is that the property which was the property of the Union at one point of time, vests fully upon the Paradip Port Trust and the Union no longer remains the owner of the property and, therefore, the exemption provided under Art.285(i) of the Constitution will not apply. In view of the rival stands of the parties, the short question for our consideration is as to who is the owner of the property in respect of which levy has been made towards holding tax.
(2.) Mr. B.M. Patnaik, the learned counsel for, the petitioner, referring to several provisions of the. Major Port Trusts Act and the preamble of the said Act, contends that the expression "vest" used in section 29 of the Act does not connote vesting of absolute title, but on the other hand, has been used in a limited sense, namely, the administration, control and management have been conferred on the Board and the property continues to belong to the Union Government to claim immunity from taxation by the State or any local authority under the State, under Art.285 of tire Constitution. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 748 of 1974*(Board of, Trustees of the Port of Kandla, Gandhidham, Kutch v. State of Gujarat). We shall, therefore, examine the different provisions relied upon by Mr. Patnaik to find, out what is the true meaning of the expression "vest" used in S.29 of the Major Port Trusts Act.
(3.) Mr. Patnaik with reference to the preamble of the Major Port Trusts Act contends that the preamble makes it abundantly clear that the Act was enacted to provide for the constitution of Port Authorities and ltd vest the, administration, control and management of such ports in the authority. It is further urged that since the preamble provides the key to the statute, the conclusion is inescapable that the Board has been created under the statute for the limited purpose of vesting therein the administration, control and management of the Port and not the property itself. In fact, the learned single Judge of the Gujarat High Court very much relied upon the aforesaid preamble in coming to the conclusion that the property continues to be the property of the Union. The preamble of a statute is not an enactment, though it 'recites the intent of the framer and the purpose for which the enactment was enacted. It is only when the enacting part is open to doubt, the preamble may be looked into to find out the true meaning of the statute. But if the enacting part is free from doubt, then the preamble can neither restrict nor extend the meaning of the enacting part. It is a cardinal principle of construction that if the words of the statute are not themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more care necessary than to expound the words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone best declare the intention of the lawgiver. In this view of the matter, one cannot start with the preamble for constructing the provisions of an Act, though one may justifiably look to the preamble only, if it is found that the language of the enacting part is ambiguous or too general. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Mrs. Leela Jain, AIR 1965 SC 1296, reversing the decision of the Rajasthan High Court, held :-