JAGANNATH AURVEDIC PHARMACY Vs. HOUSE RENT CONTROLLER CUTTACK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Petitioner, a tenant under the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), has moved this Court in an application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution with a prayer for issue of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ quashing the order dt. 23-9-1988 passed in M.R.C. Case No. 50 of 1987 pending in the Court of the House Rent Controller, Cuttack (hereinafter referred to as `the Controller') holding that the proceeding before him was maintainable and a further prayer for declaring that the Controller has no jurisdiction to proceed with the aforesaid case and that all actions taken by him after 4-5-1988 are without jurisdiction and null and void.

(2.) The challenge as indicated in the writ application and the submissions made before us is based on a very short and interesting argument that after 4-5-1988 the Act ceased to have effect and therefore, any action taken in a proceeding which was instituted under the said Act, prior to that date does not survive for adjudication. It is the case of the petitioner that undisputedly as provided in S.1(4), the Act ceased to have effect from the said date. The Act being a temporary Act it has expired by efflux of time and since it has not been repealed by any other law, the provisions of S.5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act, 1937 (hereinafter referred to as `the Orissa Act') has no application as the same relates to the effect of repeal. Since there is no repeal in the instant case, the Act has ceased to be operative by efflux of time. It was the intention of the legislature that the Act was a temporary statute intended to be effective for a certain time and after the efflux thereof, the Act was inoperative. In the aforesaid premises it was contended that the continuance of the proceeding after 4-5-1988 is not sanctioned by law and any action taken has no force in the eye of law. The legislative intent is very clear and there is no saving clause in true sense of the term. Even otherwise, the so-called saving clause was in conflict with the body of the statute which intended it to be time bound. The incorporation of the so-called saving clause is inconsistent with the object of the legislation. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the opportunity No. 2 that the argument has no substance as S.1(4) itself provides answer to such submission, and there was conflict/inconsistency.

(3.) We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length and are of the view that the basis of challenge by the petitioner though attractive carries no substance. It would be appropriate to quote S.1(4) of the Act here. "(1) Short title, extent commencement and duration (1) to (3) xx xx xx xx (4) It shall cease to have effect on the 4th day of May, 1988 except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the thereof and Section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act,1937 (Orissa Act of 1937) shall apply upon the expiry of this Act as if it had then been repealed by an Orissa Act. (Underlining by us for emphasis) We have underlined the portion as above to indicate the legislative intent. The legislature was aware of the fact that the Act was a temporary one and it was not being repealed and/or being substituted by any other Act. Therefore, a deeming clause is inserted which clearly provides that in respect of things done or omitted to be done before the date of expiry, the provisions of S.5 of the Orissa Act would be applicable as if the Act was being repealed by any other Act (referred to as the Orissa Act in the provision.). Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the Act was a temporary statute, the Orissa Act had application and particularly S.5 of the Orissa Act governed the field. S.5 of the Orissa Act reads as follows: