(1.) THIS is an application for a writ of certiorari by a petitioner who is an assessee under the IT Act of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and the order of the CIT, opposite party No. 1, dismissing the petition under S. 273A(4) of the Act has been asked to be quashed.
(2.) ASSESSEE is a registered firm and in respect of the asst. yrs. 1970 -71 and 1971 -72, as against tax demands of Rs. 2,231 and Rs. 1,696 respectively, demand of penalty and interest under different provisions of the Act of Rs. 10,300 and Rs. 3,745, respectively, was raised against it. Assessee applied to the CIT under S. 273A(4) of the Act asking for waiving the demand of penalties and interest. It claimed that the firm and its partners were not in a position to meet the demands and, in the circumstances, the same may be waived. The AO recommended the claim of the assessee for reduction in demand. After hearing assessee's counsel and considering the materials on record including the reports of the authorities, the CIT by order dated November 23, 1976, rejected the same.
(3.) THE jurisdiction which had been invoked is a discretionary one and if the CIT has taken the material aspect into consideration and has refused to exercise his discretion, we do not think it would be open to this Court to interfere with his discretion. The statutory considerations to be taken into account in disposing of an application under S. 273A(1) have been provided therein in cls. (a), (b) and (c). Similarly, in the matter of exercising jurisdiction under Sub -S. (4), the considerations have also been statutorily indicated. The CIT has, as a fact, taken some of these aspects into consideration while disposing of the application. The CIT has found that the assessee showed undue preference to other creditors and has assets still left with it. He did not find that the assessee had co -operated in the matter of recovery of taxes due from it. In what proportion the CIT would attach importance to the different considerations statutorily provided for while proceeding to exercise his discretion cannot be regulated and, at any rate, it would not be appropriate for us to interfere with his orders by finding disproportionate stress on any of the statutory considerations. We are of the opinion that interference in this case would not be justified.