(1.) Petitioner was working as a Material Chaser-cum-Recorder in the Coke-Oven and By-products (Mech.) Department of the Hindusthan Steel Limited (now Steel Authority of India Ltd., Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela, O.P. No. 2 (hereinafter called the 'company'). The General Manager of the company having been satisfied that the continuance of the petitioner in employment was inexpedient and agains the security of the establishment of opp. party No. 2, directed (vide order under Annexure-8) removal of the petitioner from service under Clause 31 of the Standing Orders with effect from 15-10-75. According to opp. party No. 2, under the Standing Orders, petitioner was paid three months' wages inclusive of one month's wages, as required to be paid under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the "Act"). Simultaneously opp. party No. 2 filed an application (Annexure-2) before the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Orissa, Bhubaneswar (Opp Party No. 1) for approval of the action taken by him in view of the pendency of I.D. Case No. 48 of 1967 in which the petitioner was a concerned workman. The Tribunal (O.P. No. 1) by order dated 23-8-76 passed in industrial Dispute Misc. case No. 49 of 1975 approved the action of opposite party No. 2 in removing the petitioner from service with effect from 15-10-75. The petitioner has now come up with this present application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India praying for issue of a writ certiorari quashing the orders under Annexure-8 passed by the General Manager of the company removing the petitioner from service and Annexure-1 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Orissa, Bhubaneswar under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act approving the order passed under Annexure-8.
(2.) The case of the petitioner is that he is a permanent employee under opp.party No.2 and has put in sincere and meritorious service since his joining in service in the year 1960 and has received several promotions. It is alleged by the petitioner that his services have been terminated in an arbitrary and capricious manner under the guise of exercise of powers under Clause 31 of the standing orders, even though no prima facie case has been made out against him and his removal has been in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice and the mandatory requirements of Clause 31 of the standing orders and also of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act have not been fulfilled, as he has not been paid his full wages for three months and the wages for one month. It is further alleged that the learned Tribunal has failed to exercise jurisdiction in the matter of scanning the management's action and in accepting the General Manager's recorded satisfaction (not legally proved) as sacrosanct, that the learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate that a more suspicion without the support of any enquiry or material facts would tantamount to giving saction to arbitrary action that there was no material before the General Manager from which he would be satisfied that the continuance of the petitioner in employment was not expedient and was against the security of the establishment; and that the Tribunal should have held that the provisions of Clause 31 of the standing orders and Section 33(2)(b) of the Act have not been complied with and the impugned order is otherwise perverse and contrary to law.
(3.) On behalf of opposite party No. 2, a counter-affidavit has been filed. In the counter it has been, inter alia, stated that when an application is made to the Tribunal for approval of the action taken by the employer, the Tribunal is not to adjudicate the original dispute. The Tribunal is only to examine as to whether the termination is bona fide and it has been done in accordance with the standing orders. The General Manager having been satisfied from the confidential information regarding the petitioner that the employment of the petitioner is not expedient and is against the security of the establishment, removed the petitioner from service as per Annexure-3. The Tribunal examined the entire matter and after taking evidence came to the conclusion that the termination of the petitioner was bona fide and there was absolutely no material on record on the basis of which it can be said that the mangement had any ulterior motive in throwing the petitioner out of service. The termination of the petitioner was validly done in accordance with the provisions of Clause 31 of the standing orders. The petitioner has been given his wages as required under Clause 31 of the standing orders and no further payment of one month's wages is provided in Section 33(2)(b) of the Act is required and in any view of the matter, the orders under Annexures 1 and 8 cannot be challenged.