RAMESHWAR LAL Vs. JOGENDRA DAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS application in revision is directed against an appellate order of the District judge, Cuttack under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The petitioners here are proprietors of a Gurakhu factory situate in Telenga bazar, Cuttack and the opposite party was serving under them in the factory. While so working opposite party is said to have met with a accident which disabled him from attending to his work with effect from 9-1-1961. After undergoing treatment when he wanted to join his duties, the petitioners refused to employ him any further. The opposite party therefore, made an application under section 15 of the Act before the Additional District Magistrate, Cuttack, who is the appropriate authority appointed under Section 15 of the Act, claiming arrears of wages for the months of November and December, 1960 and 8 days of the month of January, 1961 at the rate of Rs. 55/-per month and alleging that it is a case of retrenchment, he also claimed a month's wages in lieu of notice besides retrenchment compensation of Rs. 247-50 p. The Addl. District Magistrate reduced the retrenchment compensation claim to Rs. 220/- and allowed the other items of claim as prayed for by the opposite party. The petitioners filed an appeal before the District Judge which was dismissed and it is against that order that the petitioners have come up in revision,

(2.) AT the outset It is contended by the opposite party, that this revision petition is not maintainable on the ground that the authorities appointed under the Payment of Wages Act are not courts and much less subordinate to the High Court. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on decisions of this Court and other high Courts, namely, Labangalata Dei v. Sk. Azizullah, AIR 1958 Orissa 123; turabati v. Sorabji, AIR 1944 Nag 288; B. Triloki Nath v. Lord Krishna Sugar Mills. , ltd. , AIR 1946 All 276 and H. C. D. Mathur v. E. I. Rly. Administration, AIR 1950 all 80 (FB ). In all these cases, the revision applications were filed directly against the orders passed by the authority appointed under Section 15 of the Act. In the orissa case cited above, Barman J. held that a Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act is not a Court subordinate to the High court under Section 115, C. P. C. Hence, a revision application does not lie to the high Court from an order under Section 15 of that Act passed by the commissioner. In the Nagpur case also, the order that was challenged in revision was one passed under Section 15 of the Act by the "authority" mentioned therein and Bose. J. held that the authority is a "persona designata" and not a regular civil court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, C. P. C. The same view was expressed by Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in AIR 1946 All 276 which is also a case in which a revision was filed against an order passed by the authority under Section 15 of the Act and this view was reiterated subsequently by the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in AIR 1959 All 80. It was canvassed before their Lordships that the authority constituted under Section 15 of the Act is a Court. Referring to this contention their Lordships observed that -"the word 'court' is not a term of art having a fixed meaning: it indicates a large number of entirely divergent things. So far as a Court of law in the wider sense of the word, is concerned, any person or a body of persons, called upon to decide any question of right in accordance with judicial principles and which is a "tribunal which exercises jurisdiction by reason of the sanction of the law" is a Court. It does not, however, follow from this that every such tribunal is a Court of civil jurisdiction, to which alone Section 115, C. P. C. applies, x x x x x. The conclusive test is provided by Section 22 which excludes the jurisdiction of 'courts' in respect of matters entrusted to the jurisdiction of the authority under Section 15. Clearly, therefore, the Legislature intended that the authority constituted under Section 15, Payment of wages Act, should not be a Court. The fact that Section 18 of the Act directs that the authority should have certain powers of civil Courts and that it should be treated as a Civil Court for the purpose of Section 195 and Chap. XXXV, Criminal Procedure Code, would not lead to the inference that the authority is a civil Court. x x x x x x x. The authority created under Section 15. Payment of Wages Act, is not subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. That section, therefore, does not give the High Court jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of the authority. Hence the authority invested with jurisdiction under the payment of Wages Act is not a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115. C. P. C. "

(3.) THE present revision application is directed not against an order of the authority under Section 15 of the Act but against the appellate order passed by the District judge in exercise of his powers under Section 17 of the Act. Section 17 of the Act so far as is material may be quoted; "17. Appeal -- (1) An appeal against an order dismissing either wholly or in part an application made under Sub-section (2) of Section 15, or against a direction made under Sub-section (3) or subsection (4) of that section may be preferred, within thirty days of the date on which the order or direction was made, in a presidency-town before the Court of small Causes and elsewhere before the District Court". It may be noticed that the appeal under the section has to be filed before the district Court and not before a District Judge. If a District Judge as distinguished from a District Court had been invested with this jurisdiction such authority could be called a persona designata as distinguished from a Court. But it cannot be contended that a District Court can be designated as persona designata just because it has been invested with jurisdiction under a special Act A District Court being a civil Court subordinate to the High Court Sec. 115, C. P. C. clearly applies to orders passed by such Court. In Debidutt Dube v. Central India Electrical Supply Co. Ltd. , AIR 1945 Nag 244, an appeal was filed against an order passed by the authority under Section 15 (1) of the Act in the District Court at Jabbulpore. As against this order passed by the district Court in appeal, a revision was filed in the High Court, and in this case, a preliminary objection was raised that no revision lay against an order passed by the District Court under Section 17 of the Act. Repelling this contention it was held that the District Court decides a "case" within the meaning of Section 115, C. P. C. , when it decides an appeal under Section 17 of the Act and the High Court, therefore, has power to revise an order passed by the District Court in appeal under Sec. 17 of the Act. In Jogendranath Chatterjee and Sons v. Chandreswar singh, AIR 1951 Cal 29, an appeal against an order passed under S. 15 of the Act was filed in the Court of Small Causes and against the order passed by that Court a revision application was filed in the High Court. A preliminary objection was taken that no revision under Section 115, C. P. C. lay in as much as Section 17 of the Act provides that the decision of the authority appointed under the Payment of wages Act shall be final subject to an appeal and that inasmuch as an appeal had already been filed and decided, the unsuccessful party had no further remedy, repelling this contention, their Lordships held that all that the word "final" in section 17 of the Act means is that no further appeal would lie fom the decision of the Appellate Court, but that the Court of Small Causes being subordinate to the high Court, by virtue of the provisions of Section 115, C. P. C. , the High Court has power to revise the order passed by the Court of Small Causes. Having regard, therefore, to the provisions of the Act and the authorities on the subject, we are clearly of opinion that the revision application is maintainable.