GOBINDA CHANDRA HARICHANDAN JAGADEV Vs. STATE OF ORISSA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE four appeals arise out of orders of learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing Miscellaneous Appeals Nos. 74, 75, 76 and 77 of 1965. Those appeals were filed by the trustee of the deity Sri Jagannath Swami situate a Athagada in the district of Ganjam in respect of its properties in villages Ustapada, Ranipada, Amonia and Konkorada. The deity possessed properties which admittedly fell within the definition of a 'trust estate' as that expression is defined in Section 13 -A(e) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (herein after referred to as the Act). The notifications abolishing such estates were issued in the year 1955 by which time Section 3 -A as it now stands, was not a part of the Statute. The provision under which the estates were abolished is Section 3 of the Act which applies to all categories of estates. Chapter V of the Act contains provisions for assessment of compensation in respect the estates notified for abolition. While in the case of estates general the provision is for payment of lump sum cash compensation, an exception wag made in Section 28(2) that in respect estates held under trust or other legal obligation and dedicate exclusively to charitable or religious purposes of a public nature without any reservation of pecuniary benefit to any individual instead of paying a lump sum compensation, the compensation was to be assessed as a perpetual annuity equal to such the income of the estate and paid to the intermediary. In accordance with this provision, the annuity was calculated in respect of the disputed estates which admittedly fan in the category estates referred to in Section 8(2), and it is being paid to the Appellant.

(2.) IN 1956, the Act was amended and Section 3 -A was introduced. Sub -section (1) thereof flays that without prejudice, to the powers under Section 3, the State Government may be notification declare that the intermediary interests of all inter mediaries or a class or classes of intermediaries in the whole or part of the State have passed to and become vested in the State free from all encumbrances. It would therefore be seen that while Section 3 deals with vesting notification in respect of individual specified estates, Section A refers to a general notification whereby the intermediary interests of a class or classes of intermediaries vest in the State.

(3.) IT was, however, contended by Mr. Ramdas that Chapter II -A, having been enacted for the benefit of trust estates, a beneficial construction must he given to the various provisions of this new Chapter and therefore estates notified under Section 3 also should be entitled to make applications under Chapter II -A. It is jointed out that the purpose of both the Sections 3 and 3 -A being the same, namely, to notify an estate for being vested in the State, it should make no difference whether a notification is issued either under Section 3 or under Section 3 -A. He particularly invited our attention to Section 5 which deals with consequences of vesting of an estate in the State. That section, as it originally stood before the 1956 amendment, only referred to the publication of a notification under Sub -section (sic) of Section 3 whereafter certain consequences were to follow. After the 1956 amendment, whereunder Section 3 -A was first introduced, there was consequential amendment to Section 5, whereby it is provided that after the publication of the notification either under Sub -section (1) of Section 3 or Sub -section (1) of Section 3 -A, certain consequences mentioned therein would ensure. It is argued that it as obviously a pure accident that Chapter II -A did not make any reference to notifications issued under Section 3 and confined itself only to notifications issued under Section 3 -A. We are unable to accept this contention, although it is equally difficult for us to appreciate why the Legislature has made a distinction between notifications issued under Section 3 and under Section 3 -A, and why, if in any particular case, the authorities choose to issue a notification under Section 3 and not under Section 3 -A in respect of a trust estate, that trust estate should be deprived of the benefits of the provisions of Chapter II -A. In this connection, we would refer to the argument advanced by Mr. Ramdas on the vises of Clause (b) of Section 13 -K(b). That sub -section says that nothing in Chapter II -A shall be deemed to debar the State Government from vesting any trust estate by the issue of a notification under Section 3. The resultant position therefore is that if there are two trust estates nothing would prevent Government from notifying one of the estates under Section 3 and the other under Section 3 -A The one notified under Section 3 will not be entitled to avail itself of the beneficial provision of Chapter II -A while the other notified under Section 3 -A would be entitled to thee benefits. No guide lines have been laid down in the Statute to indicate under what circumstance Government would notify 80 trust estate either under Section 3 or under Section 3 -A. It appears to have been left to the decision of the Executive to choose either of the two courses. This is provision prima facie appears to be discriminatory and therefore void. But it is not necessary to pronounce a final opinion on this question, because a decision on this question does not appear to be material so far as the present case is concerned. Whether Section 13 -K(b) is valid or otherwise, so far as the Appellant is concerned, his estates had been notified years back under Section 3 and not under Section 3 -A of the Act and he is therefore not entitled to claim any of the benefits under Chapter II -A.