PRATAP CHANDRA BARIK Vs. STATE OF ORISSA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to quash order dated 23-10-1992 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nimanada, taking cognizance of offences punishable under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')

(2.) The present case was started on the complaint of the informant Balakrushna Kandi alleging inter alia that on 22nd April, 1992 at 12 noon, the petitioner being armed with a gun came to his residence and instructed his supporters to take away his household articles. It was further alleged that the accused persons demolished the house and took away furniture and cash amount of Rs. 100/- and the bags of paddy. On the basis of complaint, a case was registered under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 27 of the Arms Act. Subsequently, the Police submitted charge-sheet against the petitioner and seven other accused persons under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 3 of the S.C.and S.T.Act. Thereupon, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence by the impugned order dated 23-10-1992. According to the petitioner, the learned Magistrate was not empowered to take cognizance of the offence for violation of any of the provisions under the S.C.and S.T.Act and as such, the impugned order taking cognizance is not sustainable in the eye of law. Accordingly, the petitioner prays for quashing the impugned order.

(3.) Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to deal with the case. In the case at hand, a complaint was filed for the alleged commission of offences punishable under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code and under S.3 of the S.C.and S.T.Act. It is fairly accepted that the learned Magistrate is not empowered to try cases concerning atrocities as defined in S.2(a) of the Act and the Special Court under the Act is alone empowered to try such cases. A question arises as to whether the Special Court can deal with the offences punishable under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code as well. It has been held in a case reported in (1994) 7 Orissa Cri R 656 (Udhaba alias Udhaba Charan Ker v. Gora Bindhani, that in such a case, not only the Special Court should try the offences under the Act but also those punishable under the Indian Penal Code. The learned Judge concluded that the acts alleged against the accused constitute atrocities as defined under S.3 of the Act as also the offences under the Indian Penal Code as well. So the accused can be tried in the same proceedings and for that purpose, no order of commitment by the Magistrate is necessary. It was also observed that in such a case the Magistrate shall if satisfied that prima facie materials exist to show commission of offences punishable under the Act, return it for presentation to the proper Court with an endorsement to that effect. This being the accepted position of law, the irresistible conclusion is that the learned Magistrate erred in law in taking cognizance vide the order dated 23-10-1992. The proper course for him was to return the complaint to the complainant for presentation to the proper Court with an endorsement to that effect. It is not disputed that Special Judge, Puri is duly empowered to try offences under S.3 of the Act. In the case at hand, we find that after the impugned order was passed, the record of S.S.Case No. 205 of 1992 was transmitted to the Court of Special Judge, Puri who by order dated 13-9-1993 issued Non-bailable Warrant of arrest against the accused persons for their failure to appear before him in spite of the direction of the lower Court. This order of the learned Special Judge has not been challenged in this case. The petitioner challenges only the order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence under S.3 of the Act only, as observed earlier, the order of the learned Magistrate is patently wrong and is, therefore, liable to be set aside which I hereby do.