KHADALI SAHU Vs. NALLI SAHUANI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) -This Civil Revision appears to be a sequel to Civil Revision No. 141 of 1998 which has been disposed of today.

(2.) In a pending suit for partition and declaration of title, various applications were filed on behalf of the plaintiff. All those applications were rejected by the trial court by order dated 2.3.4.1998. Against the said order Civil Revision No. 141/98 had been filed which has been disposed of. After rejection of those petitions, on the next date, i.e. on 24.4.1998, the plaintiff filed an application for adjournment of the hearing of the case to enable him to file revision against the order dated 23.4.1998. The said petition was rejected by the trial court on the ground that there was no provision under the Code of Civil Procedure to grant adjournment to a party to enable him to file revision against an interlocutory order. After rejecting the petition on the aforesaid ground, the trial court proceeded with the hearing of the case. D.W. 6 was examined on behalf of the defendants as certain documents were marked. Though it is not indicated in theimpugned order, it is apparent that the plaintiff and his counsel remained absent after the prayer for adjournment had been refused and as such, the trial court purporting to act under the provisions of Order 17, Rule l(2)(c) (which must have been a mistake for '(e)'), dispensed with the cross-examination of D.W. 6. At that stage defendants 2 and 3 filed a memo to conclude the evidence from their side and not to press their petition to recall D.W. 2. The trial court proceeded to hear the arguments (obviously by the defendants) and posted the matter to 6.5.1998 for judgment. The aforesaid order is being impugned by the plaintiff.

(3.) The question as to whether a suit should be adjourned or not is definitely within the discretion of the trial court and normally a revisional court does not interfere in exercise of such discretionary power. However, keeping in view the peculiar background of the case, it is necessary in the interest of justice to interfere with the impugned order. The plaintiff had filed some petitions for examining witness and calling for certain documents. Though those petitions were rejected, the prayer seeking adjournment of a case for a short period could not be characterized as unreasonable. It is, of course, true that the suit itself was an old suit, but the reasons for pendency of the suit for a long period cannot be ascribed to the plaintiff alone and there must have been many adjournments in the suit because of other reasons including prayer for adjournment by the defendants. While it is true that justice delayed means justice denied, it is also said justice hurried is justice buried. In the present case, the trial court could have granted a reasonable time to enable the plaintiff to approach the higher forum instead of proceeding with the hearing of the suit immediately and closing the case on the side of the defendants and hearing argument on the very same day. This itself indicates that the trial court had acted in undue haste. Having regard to all these matters and particularly keeping in view the fact that one witness had not been cross-examined and arguments were heard from one side only, I set aside the impugned order No. 268, dated 24.4.1998 and direct that defendant No. 6 shall be summoned for further examination and cross-examination. From the impugned order it also appears that the learned counsel for D.Ws. 2 and 3 who had earlier filed a petition to recall D.W. 2, filed a memo to conclude the evidence on their side. It is obvious that such a memo had been filed as the plaintiff was absent and the defendants wanted to close the evidence. However, if the defendants so like they may file fresh petition to recall D.W. 2 and to examine further witnesses and if such a petition is filed by the defendants, the same shall be considered by the trial court in accordance with law. Needless to point out that after conclusion of evidence of both the sides, the trial court shall hear the arguments afresh. Since defendants 2 and 3 had no contribution in the matter and they have been possesily dragged to this court, it is directed that this order shall be subject to the condition that a sum of Rs. 250/- shall be paid as cost to the learned counsel for the opposite parties within a period of three weeks from today. If the cost as directed is not paid, the civil Revision shall be deemed to have been rejected.