LAWS(ORI)-1998-5-15

SHANTILATA PARIDE Vs. NRUSINGHA CH BEHARE

Decided On May 05, 1998
SHANTILATA PARIDE Appellant
V/S
NRUSINGHA CH.BEHARE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision application is directed against order of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Paradeep at Kujang acquitting the opposite party of the charge under S. 498-A, IPC.

(2.) The prosecution case is founded upon the allegation that the petitioner and opposite party No. 1 entered into wed lock in Baladevjou temple at Kendrapara on 14-2-1989 according to Baidik form. All the rituals, such as, performance of home, hastaganthi etc. were gone into in presence of the parents and relations. The marriage between the parties was the sequel of a love affair between the parties. After marriage both the parties started their conjugal life at Dihabalarampur. Both of them stayed at Ersama also for sometime. At the time of marriage, there was no demand for dowry. But within two months of the marriage, the opposite party made a demand for motor cycle, T. V. and other articles as a part of dowry to the marriage. The petitioner's family having failed to meet the demand, the opposite party No. 1 even assaulted the petitioner and did not change his attitude towards her in spite of intervention of local gentlemen and relations. It is alleged that opposite party No. 1 had gone to the extent of snatching away gold ornaments out of the possession of the petitioner. He did not provide her food and denied the conjugal right to her. At last on 25-5-1990 at 10 p.m. the opposite party expressed his willingness to marry for the second time and the petitioner having protested, she was driven out from the house and threatened with dire consequence. Since then petitioner is residing in a separate house on rent at Erasama. On the basis of complaint a case was registered and eventually opposite party No. 1 faced trial before the learned Magistrate which, however, ended in acquittal.

(3.) The defence denied any marital relationship between the parties and as such, it was contended that there was no question of torture to the petitioner at all.