UTKAL STEELS LIMITED Vs. SALES TAX OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN all these nine writ applications which have been heard together for the sake of convenience, the facts and the points of law arising for our consideration are the same, and they are being disposed of herewith.

(2.) ALL the petitioners are registered dealers under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 and carry on business in iron and steel materials. Besides trading in iron and steel materials, they also run rolling mills for manufacturing mild steel rods and flats, etc. , and thereafter sell them in the market. For their manufacturing purposes, they purchase raw materials from Rourkela Steel Plant and other sources in shape of ingots, moulds and scraps on furnishing declaration in form No. XXXIV for the purpose of resale in the State of Orissa which entitles them to a lesser rate of sales tax. This sale of manufactured products was included in the petitioners' taxable turnover. But the assessing officer took a view that the utilisation of the raw materials for manufacturing rods, plates, etc. , and selling the finished products thereafter amounted to violation of the declaration made in the prescribed form and thus the dealers had contravened the second proviso to section 5 (2) (A) (a) (ii) of the Act. He has accordingly added back the value of the raw materials purchased by the petitioners to their taxable turnover in accordance with the second proviso and concluded the assessment proceedings and raised the additional demands under the assessment orders in annexure 1 to each of the writ applications separately.

(3.) IT is not necessary to enter into any detailed discussion on the point as similar matters have been decided recently by different Benches of this Court including this Bench. The unreported decision of this Bench in O. J. C. Nos. 518, 519 and 973 and 1979 on 24th July, 1987 (Konark Steel Industries v. Sales Tax Officer [since reported in [1988]) 69 STC 187.) was in favour of the dealers. Another Bench consisting of G. B. Patnaik and V. Gopalaswamy, JJ. , decided on 11th September, 1987, O. J. C. Nos. 281 and 282 of 1980 [konark Steel Industries (P.) Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer [1988] 69 STC 202 (Orissa)]. Again, I, sitting with S. C. Mohapatra, J. , decided O. J. C. No. 2114 of 1980 [konark Steel Industries (P.) Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer] on 6th November, 1987 taking the same view following my earlier decision. Similarly, G. B. Patnaik, J. , sitting with L. Rath, J. , took the same view in O. J. C. Nos. 991, 992 and 993 of 1980 [b. Agarwala v. Sales Tax Officer [1988] 69 STC 231 (Orissa)] disposed of on 20th November, 1987. It may be mentioned that in the last batch of cases the learned Standing counsel (C. T.) had assailed the correctness of the earlier decisions on the basis of a decision of the Supreme Court in Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab [1967] 20 STC 430 where an observation was made that after the manufacture, the goods purchased had become a different marketable commodity, and it was accordingly submitted that the view that the goods (scrap, etc.) did not change their identity (after manufacture) was not correct. This argument was noticed by the court in great detail in paragraph 6 of the judgment and was rejected for goods reasons, namely, that the question in that case was as to whether for the purposes of the purchase tax and sales tax obviously at different points, the change of the commodity could be treated separately. I find myself in full agreement with those observations, however, with further addition that even if for the sake of argument it is accepted that a different commercial commodity was produced by the manufacturing process by the petitioner different than the raw material, still they remain nothing else than iron and steel falling under entry No. 46. Had it been the situation that the newly manufactured items were separately categorised just like entry No. 45, then it could perhaps be argued that a separate commodity within the meaning of the Act was produced. The expression "iron and steel" embraced within its fold all the species enumerated therein. Learned Standing Counsel unnecessarily argued at length by giving the illustration of G. I. pipes. Apart from his misconception, none of the petitioners has also manufactured G. I. pipes. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also brought to our notice several decisions that whenever on such decisions by this Court the State Government wanted to tax the manufactured items, a separate entry was made in the Schedule and they amended the Schedule by including the resultant products as separate items. Learned Standing Counsel urged before use the self-same points which were argued by him earlier and rejected in all the cases. I therefore do not find any reason to take any different view in the matter.