UTKAL FERO ALLOYS LTD Vs. STATE OF ORISSA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioners are accused in 2(c) C.C. No. 43 of 1985 in the Court of the Special Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack, and have challenged the order passed on 31 -1 -1985 by which cognizance of offences under Sections 9(1), (b), (bb) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') read with Rules 9(1), 53, 173B, 173C, 173F and 173G of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (for short 'the Rules') against them.

(2.) THE short facts which can be gathered from the prosecution report filed by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Cuttack, are that the petitioners being manufacturers of aluminium ingots and aluminium powder in their factory at Rairangpur in Mayurbhanj district removed and sold away 22,005.437 kgs, of aluminium powder under private challans without payment of central excise duty and without issuing central excise gate pass. They also did not file classification and price lists. Thereby they violated several provisions of the Act and the Rules necessitating submission of prosecution report against them for having committed statutory offences. Along with prosecution report several documents in its support were submitted.

(3.) MR . Deepak Misra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners raised the only contention that the impugned order of cognizance is a bald one without being supported by reasons. Therefore, it is liable to be quashed. It indeed appears from the impugned order that reasons have not been assigned, but at the stage of cognizance it is not required to furnish detailed reasons in support of the order of cognizance. All that is required under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence should be of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In the present case, in view of the facts stated in the prosecution report and the supporting documents, the Court below formed the opinion that there was sufficient ground to proceed against the accused persons and so he issued process. In other words, on consideration of the material available to him he found a prima facie case against the accused and so he took cognizance of the offences and thereafter issued process in accordance with law. In view of these facts, I hardly find any reason to interfere with the impugned order at this stage. If, after prosecution evidence is adduced, it will be disclosed that there is no material evidence against the accused persons for proceeding with the case, the petitioners shall be justified in pleading before the Trial Court for their discharge.