BIRIDI CHANDA MADA Vs. STATE OF ORISSA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution by an assessee residing within the limits of Cuttack Municipality, against an order dated the 20th august 1955, passed by the Additional District Magistrate, declining to review his previous appellate order.

(2.) THE petitioner was the owner of two-houses in holding Nos. 1637/718 and 1640/722 of Ward No. 24 of Cuttack Municipality. The two holdings were assessed to Municipal tax and the petitioner filed two appeals, Nos. 2172 and 2173 against the assessment order, under Section 153 of the Orissa Municipal Act, before the additional District Magistrate. The appellate authority dismissed both the appeals by his order dated the 11th March 1955. The petitioner then filed two petitions before the Additional District Magistrate, for review of his appellate order, one on the 4th April 1955 an respect of Appeal No. 2172 and the other on the 2nd June 1955 in respect of Appeal No. 2173. These petitions for review were filed under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 156 of the Orissa Municipal Act which is as follows:

(3.) ON a literal construction of the said proviso there is some room for argument that the order of the prescribed authority on a review petition must be passed within three months from the date of the appellate order. But such a construction would go against the well known maxim of 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' (an act of Court shall prejudice no man ). The first review petition was filed as early as the 4th April 1955. The Additional District Magistrate had nearly two months time to pass final orders on that petition. But for some reason or other there was delay and once the period of three months from the date of his appellate order expired that Officer thought that he had no jurisdiction in the matter. Similarly, though the second review petition was filed on the 2nd June 1955 and the Additional District Magistrate should have passed orders on it before the 11th June 1955 assuming that his interpretation of the second proviso to Section 156 (2) of the Act is correct. In both the instances, the delay is directly attributable to the action of the Court. The Additional District Magistrate has frankly admitted in his counter-affidavit filed before us and also in his orders on the review petitions, that the delay was mainly due to his being under the wrong impression that the limitation of three months applied only to the date of filing of the review petitions and not to the date on which the final order on those petitions was passed by him. Thus, on his own wrong interpretation of the proviso the period of limitation was allowed to expire and the Court cannot take advantage of its own mistake to the prejudice and rights of a party.