SURESH CHANDRA SWAIN Vs. STATE OF ORISSA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application invoking the powers of this Court under S. 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing the proceedings in G. R.Case No. 144 of 1986 pending in the court of the S.D.J.M., Champua since the F.I.R.on the basis of which the investigation has started does not disclose any offence. The F.I.R.was lodged by the E-ecutive Officer, N.A.C., Joda, on 3-4-86 stating that it had been found in course of audit of the accounts of N. A.C. for the year 1984-85 of the petitioner having misappropriated a sum of Rs. 1,302/- through adoption of fraudulent process and that the amount related to collection vide miscellaneous receipt Nos. 841 to 852. It is the petitioner's case that the audit referred to in the F.I.R.as its basis did not disclose any offence against the petitioner, much less found him to have misappropriated any money, and hence the F.I.R.being based on such audit report, the investigation commenced upon it is liable to be quashed. The petitioner has e-tracted the relevant portion of the audit report in the petition which runs as follows :-

(2.) It is fairly conceded by the learned Additional Government Advocate, as is evidenced by order No. 11 dt. 3-6-87, that the audit report on the basis of which the F.I.R.has been lodged does not disclose any offence under S. 409, I.P.C. The learned Additional Standing Counsel who ultimately conducted the case at the hearing stage, however, has contested the case raising two questions ) that an application under S. 482, Cr.P.C. does not lie to quash an investigation and that the powers under the section can be invoked only to quash a proceeding after cognizance has been taken, and (2) that in any view of the matter, since the investigation of the case was not stopped and during the investigation certain other statements have come in implicating the petitioner in a case of misappropriation, the power under S. 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be e-ercised to quash the investigation only because the F.I.R.does not disclose any offence.

(3.) So far as the first submission is concerned, it stands liquidated by the weight of authorities. S. 482, Cr.P.C. saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In terms, the section is not confined only to proceedings before the court after cognizance has been taken. This is a plenary power so as to secure the ends of justice and there is nothing which prevents the inherent powers of the court to reach its hands where an obvious injustice is perpetrated in the shape of investigation. E-amining the question in AIR 1960 SC 866 (R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab) it was held that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be e-ercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice though ordinarily the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceeding at an interlocutory stage and as an e-ample of the categories of cases where proceedings could be quashed under inherent jurisdiction it was stated that where manifestfy a legal bar e-ists against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged, say, absence of sanction where it is requisite; or where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, as the case may be, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; or where the allegations made do constitute an offence but there is either no legal evidence in support of it or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge; though so far as the last case is concerned the distinction between absence of legal evidence or acceptance of evidence which is e- facie inconsistent to the accusation made and the e-istence of legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question is to be kept in view and that the High Court in e-ercise of its inherent jurisdiction would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence as it e-ists is reliable or not which is the function of a trying Magistrate. The matter came to be again e-amined by the Supreme Court in AIR 1982 SC 949 (State of West Bengal v. Sanchaita Investments), where the petitioners, the partners of the Sanchaita Investments, moved the High Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the State Government and its concerned officials to "forthwith recall, cancel and withdraw the first information report... and all proceedings taken on the basis thereof." In the case, the F.I.R.alleged an offence against the petitioners of violation of S. 3 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 punishable under S. 4 of the said Act. The Calcutta High Court held the activities of the firm to fall beyond the provisions of that Act and the search and seizure to be illegal and improper, and hence the proceedings were quashed directing return of all the documents and refund of the cash money seized to the writ petitioners. The matter came before the Supreme Court on special leave by way of appeal at the instance of the State of West Bengal. Dismissing the appeal the Supreme Court held that no offence had been disclosed under the Act and hence it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of investigation against the alleged offence to be completed as any investigation, in the absence of any offence being disclosed, will result in unnecessary harassment to a party, whose liberty and property may be put to jeopardy for nothing. Being of such opinion, the court saw no alternative save to stop all further investigations on the basis of the F.I.R.as laid.