UCHHABA JENA Vs. KUNJABEHARI RAUTARY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ON 17.9.1974, an application was made by Kunjabehari Rautray (opposite party No.1) for initiation of a proceeding under Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the learned Magistrate sent the application to the Officer -in -charge of the Nimapara Police Station for a report. On 24.9.1974, the Police recommended initiation of a proceeding and suggested that interim bonds may be taken under Section 116 (3) of the Code. On 12.2.1975, a proceeding under Section 107 of the Code was initiated and members of the second party were noticed to appear. On 30th of August, 1975, members of the second party contended before the learned Magistrate that as the proceeding could not be completed within six months from initiation of the inquiry as required under Section 116 (6) of the Code, the same should stand terminated. The learned Magistrate dropped the proceeding on the sole ground that the inquiry under Section 107 had been instituted on 12.2.1975 and though more than six months had elapsed since then, the inquiry could not be completed. On the self -same day, opposite party No.1 filed another application for initiation of a fresh proceeding under Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code wherein he referred to the earlier proceeding and the manner in which it had got concluded. On the basis of the materials placed, the learned Magistrate was pleased to direct notice to members of the second party in accordance with law. The matter was adjourned from time to time - sometimes at the instance of the members of the second party and on some other occasions at the instance of the court. On 26.12.1975, the learned Magistrate required the Officer -in -charge of the Police Station to be examined in support of the request for taking of interim bonds. On 22nd of January, 1976, the Officer -in -charge could not appear, but the Assistant Sub -Inspector of Police was examined and the learned Magistrate required the Officer -in -charge to appear on 2.2.1976. Ultimately on 27.2.1976, the Officer -in -charge was examined and on 12th of March, 1976, the matter relating to furnishing of interim bonds was heard. On 25.3.1976, the learned Magistrate passed an order requiring interim bonds to be furnished by members of the second party to the tune of Rs. 500/ - each for keeping the peace. Against the said order, the members of the second party carried a revision before the learned Sessions Judge of Puri. By the impugned order he declined to interfere. The writ application has been filed for quashing of the direction for furnishing interim bonds on the basis that a second revision at the instance of the petitioners would not be maintainable in law in view of the bar under the new Code of Criminal Procedure.

(2.) THE connected miscellaneous application is one for invoking the inherent powers of this Court in terms of Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing of another part of the self -same order by which the learned Magistrate declined to drop the proceeding notwithstanding that the period of six months from the commencement of enquiry had elapsed. It is alleged that no justifying reasons have been given to continue the proceeding and though the learned Sessions Judge had been moved in the matter, he has not applied his mind appropriately. It is alleged that continuing the proceeding would prejudice the petitioners and would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Petitioners, therefore, have asked for quashing of the proceeding in exercise of inherent powers vested in the court. That is how the writ application and the criminal miscellaneous proceeding have arisen.

(3.) AT the hearing, Mr. Mohapatra for the opposite party No.1 contended that the six months fixed under sub sections(6) have to be counted from the date of commencement of the inquiry and not from the date the proceeding commenced. All the delinquents appeared before the learned Magistrate on 25.9.1975. Mr. Misra contends that the inquiry" must be deemed to have started with effect from that while Mr. Mohapatra claims that the inquiry can only start when the learned Magistrate proceeded to receive evidence, and, therefore, the inquiry must be deemed to have commenced on 22.1.1976, when the Assistant Sub -Inspector of Police was examined toy the learned Magistrate. If Mr. Misra's submission be correct, 25.3.1976 would be the end of six months from the date of inquiry while if Mr. Mohapatra's contention be correct, the proceeding continues up to July, 1976 and no objection could be raised against the Magistrate continuing the proceeding. We think it, therefore, relevant to consider when exactly the inquiry can be said to have commenced. Mr. Mohapatra relies upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye v. Ved Murti, AIR 1971 SC 2481 : (1971 Cri LJ 1715). In para. 16 of the judgment, the Court observed (at p.2485 of AIR) : -