CHANDRABHANU GOUNTIA Vs. DURBADAL NAIK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE first party in a proceeding under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code, has preferred this revision against the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sambalpur in Criminal Revision No. 23(3) (S) of 1974 -75 remanding the case to the trial court for a fresh determination of the question of possession involved in this proceeding after taking into consideration the affidavits sworn and the written statements filed in the Court of the S.D.O., Sambalpur and in the court of Shri A.R. Sabat, another First Class Magistrate at Sambalpur. In view of the limited question involved in this revision, it is not necessary for me to state here the respective cases put forward by the contesting parties on the question of possession of the disputed property.

(2.) MR . Basu, the learned counsel for the opposite parties, at the outset opposed the maintainability of this revision on the ground that the impugned order being an interlocutory order in the proceeding, Section 397 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, bars a revision against such an order. According to Mr. Basu, the proceeding under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code, is still alive, and so the impugned order passed in the said proceeding is merely an interlocutory order, and so no revision is maintainable against that order as provided under Section 397(2) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Mr. Swain, the learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand contends that the impugned order is a final order for all intents and purposes and its effect cannot be questioned or remedied at any later stage and so it does not come within the purview of Section 397 (2) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

(3.) ON a consideration of the Supreme Court decisions, I am firmly of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision under Section 397 (2) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. By the impugned order the court below has washed its hands clean of the matter pending before it, and it cannot any further pass any order in that Criminal Revision which had been filed before it. By the impugned order the case before the court below has come to an end, and so far as that court is concerned it is a final order. Moreover, that order is conclusive as to the persons affected by that order, as they would not have any further effective opportunity to challenge this order at any other stage, for after the decision of the dispute under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code, by the court to which it has been remanded it would be useless and purposeless to challenge this order of remand. Considering the above aspects of this case, I am of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of this case the impugned order is not an interlocutory order but is a final order for all intents and purposes, and so this revision against that order is not hit by the provisions of Section 397 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.