(1.) THE appellant as plaintiff filed Title Suit No.58 of 1993 in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Parlakhemundi for a declaration that he is the absolute owner in possession of the suit land and for an injunction restraining the present respondents, who were defendants, from entering into the suit land or interfering with his peaceful possession. The plaintiffs case in short was that the suit land was the joint family property, which on partition in 1956 fell to his share and since then he is in exclusive possession of the same as owner and title holder, but in the year 1992, the Tahasildar, Parlakhemundi (respondent No.2) wrongly attached the standing crops of the suit land. On inquiry, he could know that the respondents are claiming the suit land on the plea that the State purchased it in the Court auction in E.P. No.11 of 1973 arising out of M.S. No.18 of 1957 of the Court of Munsif, Parlakhemundi. The claim of the plaintiff -appellant was that he was not aware of the suit or the execution proceeding, that the suit property was not liable for attachment or sale, that the sale by way of auction, if any, was invalid as permission under Section 22 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act (in short 'the Act) had not been obtained. The present respondents as defendants in their joint written statement refuted the claim of the plaintiff pleading inter alia that the suit land belonged to the father of the plaintiff and his brother and the said land was purchased by the State in public auction sale in E.P. No.11 of 1973 and therefore, the plaintiff cannot now challenge the title of the State over the suit land particularly when after the auction purchase the suit land has already been mutated in the name of the State. It was further pleaded that State not being a person, permission of the Revenue Officer contemplated under Section 22 of the Act was not necessary and the suit is not maintainable in view of the bar provided under Section 67 of the Act. From the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed as many as six issues, accepted evidence of the parties and on perusal of those evidence decreed the claim of the plaintiff. In the said judgment one of the findings was that the State is a 'person and permission of the Revenue authority under Section 22 of the Act was necessary for the sale of the suit land to the respondent No.1 in the public auction. The defendants (present respondents) filed Title Appeal No.26 of 1995 in the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Gajapati, Parlakhemundi challenging the aforesaid judgment and decree of learned Civil Judge. The appellate Court on consideration of the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and materials on record allowed the appeal in part without cost with an observation that State is not a person, so far as Section 22 of the Act is concerned and therefore, permission of the Revenue authority was not necessary when the suit land was sold to the State in public auction. Aggrieved by such observation, the appellant has filed this second appeal.
(2.) THE only substantial question of law, which has been formulated for consideration is as follows : "Whether the State Government can be construed as a 'person in terms of Section 22 of the O.L.R. Act"
(3.) MR . Sangram Das, learned counsel for the State per contra states that when there is no specific definition provided in the Act itself, the meaning of the particular word or provision has to be ascertained from the contents and spirit of the Act. He indicates that when there is no specific definition of the word 'person in the Act the definition of 'person provided in Section 2(33) of the Orissa General Clauses Act, 1937 would govern the field because the said Act clearly provides that to facilitate the interpretation of the Orissa Acts and to shorten the language used therein, the provisions of Orissa General Clauses Act have been incorporated.He points out that the definition of 'person provided in Orissa General Clauses Act does not include 'State and for that reason the word 'person used in Section 22 of the Act would not include the State. Mr. Das further argues that the OLR Act has been created to protect the interest of the weaker section of the society, namely the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the spirit of the Act indicates that the State is to act as protector of the properties of the person belonging to the weaker section; and that being so, the State cannot be equated with persons belonging to the general category, who have been restricted from purchasing the properties of the persons belonging to the Scheduled Tribes. It is also argued by Mr. Das that observation given in a judicial proceeding in connection with the provision of a particular Act cannot be universally applied to other cases unless the provision noted in the concerned Act is pari meteria to the provisions of the Act under consideration. He submits that the observation given in AIR 1967 S.C.997 (supra) was in connection with Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, which does not contain provision similar to the O.L.R. Act and for that reason, the observation in that judgment that the 'State is also a 'person cannot be applied to the present situation. Mr. Das also contends that when certain aspect is not specifically spelt out in the Act, the Court has to give effect to the meaning of the provision taking into consideration the spirit and contents of the entire Act. According to him, if the spirit and contents of the Act is taken as a whole, there cannot be any inference that the restriction provided in Sub -section (3) of Section 22 of the Act is applicable to the State. In support of his submission, Mr. Das relied on the Cases of Smt. Lila Vati Bai, v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 S.C.521; Commissioner of Income -tax, Bangalore v. Venkateswara Hatcheries (P) Ltd., AIR 1999 S.C.1225; Regional Executive, Kerala Fishermens Welfare Fund Board v. M/s. Fancy Food and another etc., AIR 1995 S.C. 1620 and Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and others, 2004 (II) OLR (SC) 117.