DAYANIDHI TRIPATHY Vs. SURENDRANATH SWAIN I P S

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner, Dayanidhi Tripathy alias Mahamaya Brahmachari of Meria Bazar, Cuttack, has come to this Court praying. Inter alis, to initiate a proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act and to take suitable action under Section 12 thereof and for imposition of punishment or penalty as against the opp. parties for not taking effective steps to execute the N. B. Ws. in respect of the accused person's in ICC No. 177/92 pending in the Court of the Sub -Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sadar, Cuttack.

(2.) NOTICE was issued on 13 -9 -1995 and affidavits have been filed. The question of maintainability has been considered by this Court. Our attention has been drawn to a decision reported in AIR 1954 SC 186 : Sukhdev Singh v. Hon'ble C. J. S. Teja Singh and the Hon'ble Judge of the Punjab High Court at Patiala. In the aforesaid case, the nature of jurisdiction to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and the scope of the contempt proceeding before the High Court were considered. Our attention has also been drawn to a Bench decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1981 SC 723 : S.K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U. P. v. Vinay Chandra Misra, in regard to the scope and power of High Court in contempt proceeding under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India. It is specifically observed in paragraph 18 of the aforesaid judgment that if the High Court is directly moved by a petition by a private person feeling aggrieved (not being the Advocate -General), the High Court has, in such a situation, a discretion to refuse to entertain the petition, or to take cognizance on its own motion on the basis of the information supplied to it in that petition. If the petitioner is a responsible member of the legal profession, it may act suo motu, more so, if the petitioner advocate prays that the Court should act suo motu. This mode of taking suo motu cognizance of contempt of a subordinate Court should be resorted to sparingly where the contempt concerned is of a grave and serious nature. Harmoniously construed, Section 15(2) does not restrict the power of the High Court to take cognizance of and punish contempt of a subordinate Court, on its own motion. Hence, it cannot be said that the High Court has acted improperly or illegally in taking suo motu cognizance of criminal contempt of subordinate Court on the petition of an advocate. Various aspects have been discussed and considered in details. - -