NIRANJAN PRADHAN Vs. STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Petitioners call in question legality of Sec. 32 of the Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1962 (in short, 'the Act') as amended by the Orissa Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1991. The said provision deals with the power of the Registrar for supersession of a committee, and to disqualify officers of the society. According to the petitioners, the power given to the Registrar to do so is unbriddled and arbitrary, and is, therefore, violative of Articles 14 and 19(1 )(c) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short, 'the Constitution'). Learned counsel for the State supported the provision saying that there is nothing vulnerable in it.

(2.) Before we deal with respective contentions of the petitioners and the State, it is necessary to take note of the provision itself as it stood before its amendment and after amendment. BEFORE AMENDMENT

(3.) Challenge as to legality of the provisions contained in Sec. 32 as raised by the petitioners is essentially on the grounds (a) the Registrar has got an unbriddled and arbitrary power to direct supersession of a Committee and disqualification of the officers. The action if any to be taken has to be taken after obtaining views of the Financing Bank, and the provision is contradictory in terms because in sub-section (1) the requirement is 'consultation, and in sub-section (4) reference is made to the 'opinion' of the Financing Bank. The two are conceptually different, and therefore, the provision is unclear and there is likelihood of misuse. In sub-section (4) the deeming provision operates if the opinion of the Financing Bank is not received in writing within thirty days of the reference made under sub-section (1). Interestingly sub-section (1) refers to a period of twenty-one days from the 'date of issue of notice'. Comparing the provision as it stood before amendment and after amendment, it is submitted that before taking any action under sub-section (1) consultation with the Financing Bank was a pre-requisite. In other words only after consultation was done any action under sub-section (1) as it stood prior to amendment was available to be taken. But the amended provision makes it simultaneous and therefore, the initiation of the proceeding even during or before consultation/obtaining opinion of the Financing Bank gives scope for mala fide action. This according to the petitioners attaches vulnerability to the constitutionality of the provision of Sec. 32.