SIANI NAG Vs. GOBARDHAN GANDA AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Petitioner challenges the order of the revisional authority under the Orissa Land Reforms Act, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') who by the impugned order has directed restoration of possession in favour of opposite party No. 1 under Section 23 -A of the Act.

(2.) AN application under Section 23 -A of the Act was filed by opposite party No. 1 alleging that the Petitioner is in illegal possession of the raiyati land of opposite party No. 1 since 1961 appertaining to plot Nos. 446/1760 and 446/1761 of khata No. 55. Since the said possession is in contravention of Section 22 of the Act, an order of eviction should be passed against the Petitioner. The Revenue Officer rejected the said application by coming to the conclusion that Section 23 -A of the Act does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the case. On appeal, the Additional District Magistrate affirmed the aforesaid order of the Revenue Officer. Opposite party No. 1 thereafter carried a revision to the Special Officer, Land Reforms. The revisional authority by his order dated 22 -3 -1983 in O.L.R. Revision Case No. 27 of 1981 allowed the revision and held that opposite party No. 1 was entitled to get back the lands under Section 23 -A of the Act.

(3.) THE revisional authority has taken the view that if a person has not perfected his title by way of adverse possession on the date the President's Act 17 of 1973 came into force by which the extended period of thirty years possession became necessary to acquire title by adverse possession then in such a case if the unauthorised occupant has not been in possession for thirty years by the time when Section 23 -A came on the statute book, he can be evicted by the Revenue Officer under the provisions of Section 23 -A of the Act. In other words, he has held that the extended period of limitation would also apply to an application under Section 23 -A of the Act. In my view, the aforesaid conclusion cannot be sustained in law. Section 23 -B(2) clearly states that the thirty year period would apply to proceedings under Section 23 of the Act. It is an accepted rule of construction that the words, phrases and sentences of a statute are ordinarily to be understood in their natural, ordinary and grammatical meaning unless such a construction leads to an absurdity or the context or object of the statute suggests a different meaning. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do in such cases best declare the intention of the law -giver. See, opinion of Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case 11 Cl & F. page -143 quoted in the case of The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. John Frederick Pemsel, (1891) A.C. 531 (H.L.). The duty of a Judge is to expound as to what is the true intention of the Legislature and it is within the province of the Legislature to determine what is best for the public good and to provide for it by proper legislation. In the case of Nagendra Nath Dey and Anr. v. Suresh Chandra Dey and Ors. : A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 165, construction of Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908 came up for consideration. It was observed by their Lordships: