LAWS(ORI)-2016-8-98

LAXMI NARAYAN THAKUR Vs. JAGANATH JENA & OTHERS

Decided On August 30, 2016
LAXMI NARAYAN THAKUR Appellant
V/S
Jaganath Jena And Others Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ petition has been filed assailing the impugned orders under Annexures- 2, 3 and 5. In assailing the impugned orders, the petitioners have a specific ground that the proceeding under Section 36-A of the O.L.R. Act has been decided behind the back of the petitioners and the petitioners have not been made party there. Sri Routray, learned counsel for the petitioners also alleges that there is violation of statutory requirements contained in Section 36-A of the O.L.R. Act in as much as not only there has been no opportunity of personal hearing but there is also no proper notice in the particular area and no consultation to the Local Committee made before concluding the matter and thus the impugned orders for being contrary to mandatory requirement of Section 36-A of the Act, is bad in law. Consequently, it is urged that the impugned orders also become bad in law. Further, since the petitioner is a perpetual minor, this case is covered under the definition of Section 2 (21) of the O.L.R. Act and being a perpetual minor, adequate precaution should have been taken before concluding the proceeding. Learned counsel for the petitioners also has a serious objection that even though notice for objection was issued in the locality on 23.9.1976 in the application under Section 36-A of the O.L.R. Act, the final order in the proceeding was also passed on the same day. It is on these premises, Sri Routray, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the impugned orders are not sustainable on each of the count and therefore, this Court should interfere in the impugned orders under Annexures 2, 3 and 5 and set aside the same.

(2.) Sri S.Das, learned Additional Standing Counsel in his submission contended that the observation of the revisional authority so far it relates to notice and taking consultation of the Local Committee are concerned, is erroneous but so far as the observation and finding of the revisional authority on other aspects, there is no infirmity leaving any scope for interference of this Court in the impugned orders.

(3.) Reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that the proceeding initiated under Section 36-A of the O.L.R. Act not only required to be heard after giving the parties an opportunity of hearing but after consulting the Local Committee and further circulating a notice in the area calling for objection from the interested persons. Looking to the pleadings of the petitioners in the revision petition and the contentions raised herein, this Court finds that the petitioners have a demonstrated a prima facie case of having right, title and interest over the disputed property. Further, looking to the allegation that the order on the application under Section 36-A of the O.L.R. Act was passed on the date of notice in the locality itself, the order passed under Annexure-1 cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Further, for not considering the allegations of the petitioners and the violation of provision of law as well as the order being passed behind the back of the petitioners, all the subsequent orders passed by the original authority as well as by the revisional authority are also not sustainable in the eye of law. Consequently, this Court while allowing the writ petition sets aside the orders under Annexures-2, 3 and 5.