PRANABANDHU PANDA Vs. STATE OF ORISSA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Criminal Misc. Case arises out of a petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. wherein the petitioners have sought for quashing the proceeding in G.R, Case No. 998 of 2000 pending before S.D.J.M., Sambalpur. Petitioner No. 3 is the husband of Opp.Party No. 2 while petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 are parents-in-law and petitioner No. 4 is her sister-in-law. Petitioner No. 3 married Opp.party No. 2 on 8.5.1997 in accordance with Hindu Rites and their Caste Custom at Sambalpur. After solemnization of marriage, Opp.party No. 2 lived in the official quarters of petitioner No. 1 at Bilaspur (Madhya Pradesh). It is alleged that the petitioners harassed Opp.party No. 2 in many a ways for non-fulfilment of their demand of a Car towards dowry. For some time Opp.Party No. 2 lived with petitioner No. 3 in Indore where the later was serving as Income Tax Inspector. During her stay there, Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 also tortured her for non-fulfilment of their demand of a Car. In the meantime since Opp.Party No. 2 conceived, her parents brought her to Sambalpur where she gave birth to a male child on 23.9.1998. None of the petitioners visited Sambalpur to see the newborn baby till 1.10.1998 when Petitioner Nos. 1 and 3 went there and requested the parents of Opp.Party No. 2 to send her (Opp.Party No. 2) with the child to Bilaspur. Accordingly, Opp.party No. 2 and her child were escorted to Bilaspur on 13.10.1998 only to be neglected by the petitioners. On being informed of this, mother of Opp.party No. 2 came to Bilaspur and with the consent of the petitioners brought back Opp.Party No. 2 with the new born baby to Sambalpur. On 30.1.2000 father of the Opp.Party No. 2 conveyed a Panchayati of his caste men at Sambalpur where petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 were also present. They were requested by the Ponchmen to take back Opp.Party No. 2 and her child but they insisted that unless a Maruti Car was given they would not take them back. So, finding no other way Opp.Party No. 2 filed I.C.C. Case No. 40 of 2000 before the learned S.D.J.M., Sambalpur on the allegation of commission of offence punishable under Sections 498-A/34 I.P.C. read with Section 4 of the D.P, Act. The S.D.J.M. forwarded the complaint petition to the O.I.C., Mahila P.S. Sambalpur directing to treat it as F.I.R. and investigate into the case. Accordingly the O.I.C. treating it as F.I.R. registered P.S. Case No. 17 of 2000 and took up investigation. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted under Sections 498-A/406/34 I.P.C. read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act against all the petitioners. The S.D.J.M., (S), Sambalpur took cognizance of the said offences on 27.7.2001 against all the petitioners who faced their trial. On 4.5.2005 the petitioners filed the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before this Court with prayer to quash the proceeding as mentioned above.

(2.) Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that as envisaged under Section 177 of Cr.P.C. every offence should be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. In the case at hand, the alleged occurrence having been taken place at Bilaspur and Indore, the S.D.J.M., Sambalpur lacks territorial jurisdiction to try the case. In support of his submission he relied on the decision in Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Anr. (2004) 29 OCR (SC) 241. As against this, learned Counsel for the Opp.Party No. 2 submitted that as per the complaint petition, on 30.1.2000 petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 reiterated their demand for a Maruti Car as dowry at Sambalpur also. So, the S.D.J.M. has jurisdiction to entertain the Criminal Case. Learned Counsel for the petitioners further submitted that petitioner No. 1, who was working as a Research Officer, Tribal Development Department, Madhya Pradesh was on Election duty as Zonal Officer, for the three tiers Panchayat Election at Chhatisgarh, the 1st phase of which was held on 28.1.2000 and the second phase on 1.2.2000. So, it cannot be conceived that he could be at Sambalpur on 30.1.2000. In support of his submission that the petitioner No. 1 was on Election Duty during the relevant time he relied on a certificate granted by the Sub-Collector Bilaspur showing that petitioner No. 1 was engaged as Zonal Officer to conduct the 1999-2000 three tiers Panchayat Election. He also relied on an affidavit sworn by the petitioner No. 1 to that effect. In this context learned Counsel for the Opp.Party No. 2 submitted that this Court cannot go into any document other than the documents produced by the Prosecution. So the certificate issued by the Sub-Collector, Bilaspur cannot be taken into consideration. Similarly, the affidavit sworn by petitioner No. 1 stating that he was engaged in election duty on 30.1.2000 at Bilaspur cannot be accepted.

(3.) It is the settled principle of law that an accused cannot be permitted to adduce defence evidence at the stage of taking cognizance of an offence or framing of charge. At these stages the Court has to examine the materials produced by the prosecution only. Of course in a proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., this Court, in exceptional cases can look into the documents which are of unimpeachable character and can legally be translated to relevant evidence. In the case at hand the certificate dated 14.11.2005 issued by the Sub-Collector, Bilaspur shows that petitioner No. 1 was engaged by the Collector, Bilaspur vide order dated 19.1.2005 as Zonal Officer in 1999-2000 three tiers Panchayat Election. It does not reflect the date of election. As per the decision in Smt. Sudha Devi v. M.P. Narayanan and Ors. affidavits are not included in the definition of evidence in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. The same can be used as evidence only if for sufficient reasons Court passes an order under Order XIX Rule 1 or 2 of C.P.C. So, the affidavit sworn by petitioner No. 1 cannot be considered as evidence. Neither the certificate issued by the Sub-Collector, Bilaspur nor the affidavit can be considered to be of unimpeachable character and neither of the documents can be legally translated to relevant evidence. So both the documents cannot be taken into consideration by this Court. Accordingly, from the available material it cannot be said that petitioner No. 1 did not attend the meeting at Sambalpur on 30.1.2000.