AHMED ALLI KHAN Vs. SANJEEDA BEGAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) APPELLANT questions jurisdiction of the Family Court set up under the Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter called 'the Act') to deal with an application under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (in short, the 'Divorce Act'). Undisputed position is that the respondent had file an application under Section 3 of the Divorce Act claiming maintenance from appellant for dower due, reasonable provisions for maintenance as part of dower due return of gifts and other connected reliefs. In that view of the matter, we need not go into the factual aspects in detail. Foundation of appellant's challenge to legality of the proceeding before the Family Court is that Divorce Act being a special statute providing jurisdiction to a Judicial Magistrate of First Class to deal with an application under Section 4 of the said Act. Family Courts Act does not operate and the Court set up under that Act has no jurisdiction to entertain the application.

(2.) SECTION 7 of the Act is the pivotal provision for determination of controversy. The same reads as follows :

(3.) IT is urged by learned counsel for the respondent that the expression 'proceeding' is wide enough to engulf an application under Section 3. Though the submission is attractive, it is clearly unacceptable, because the context in which the word 'proceeding' has been used in juxtaposition to the word 'suit', indicates that the proceeding also has to be one akin in a suit, or related to a suit. It cannot extend to a proceeding of a criminal nature. Similarly no application under Section 3 lies to the District Court or subordinate Civil Court. The expression 'District Court or subordinate Civil Court' clearly indicates that legislature wanted that the disputes of civil nature are encompassed by Sub -section (1) of Section 7. So far as Section 7, Sub -section (2) is concerned, it has to be noticed that Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub -section (2) deal with two different aspects. The first deals with the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the First Class under Chapter IX of the Code, while the latter deals with such other enactment.