LAWS(ORI)-1985-6-21

J SUBBA RAO Vs. BRUNDABAN CHANDRA SAHOO

Decided On June 27, 1985
J Subba Rao Appellant
V/S
Brundaban Chandra Sahoo Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner who is the Manager of the Indian Fare Earths Limited, Chatrapur, being aggrieved by the order of the Magistrate dated 24. 10. 1933 ordering him to pay Rs. 100/ - towards compensation under Section 250(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code' ) has preferred this revision.

(2.) ON 4th of March, 1977, the petitioner had written a letter to the Officer -in -charge, Chatrapur P. S. in the district of Ganjam intimating that their Company Bus which was carrying officers of the Company on that day when stopped at Chatrapur near Railway Station Cross, another bus came from behind and three passengers of the latter bus dragged the driver of the Company Bus, abused him and beat him in presence of the officers and staff of the Indian Rare Earths Limited who were in the bus. Of the persons who assaulted the driver was one Mr. Sahu, Cashier of the Andhra Bank at Rambha are another person was working in the Aska Multipurpose Co -operative Society. On the said information by the petitioner, a case was registered at Chatrapur Police Station and ultimately G. R. Case No. 88 of 1977 was instituted in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate Chatrapur. The Police after completion of investigation filed charge sheet against the two accused persons under Secs. 341/323/34, Indian Penal Code. The accused persons stood their trial of the said offences but ultimately by judgment dated 7. 9. 1983, they were acquitted under Section 255(1) of the Code While passing the order of acquittal, the learned Magistrate was of the opinion that there was no reasonable ground for the management of the Indian Rare Earths Limited to ledge such an information against the two accused persons implicating them in the alleged offences for which they have been suffering for the last six years for no fault of them and, therefore, directed that the informant who was the Project Officer of the Indian Pare Earths Limited, should explain as to why he should not pay compensation to the accused under Section 250 of the Code. The petitioner pursuant to the said notice submitted his show cause indicating therein that he had received the said information from the Security Officer of the Company and as the administrative head of the Company had in good faith reported the matter to the Police to prevent further recurrence of similar incident. The learned Magistrate, however, by the impugned order came to the conclusion that the informant did not act in good faith while lodging the information and, therefore, incurred the liability to pay compensation under Section 250 of the Code. The petitioner challenges the said order in this revision.

(3.) SECTION 250 of the Coda is the provision empowering the Magistrate to award compensation for accusation without reasonable cause. This provision has a two -i old object, firstly, to award by a summary order some compensation to the person against whom there was no reasonable ground for making the accusation and secondly, the aim is at preventing persons from making accusation without any reasonable ground. But the test for applicability of the section is 'total absence of any reasonable ground for the accusation, which in most cases tantamounts to 'actual knowledge of the falsity of the accusation'. Under Sub - Section (I) of Section 250, when the Magistrate either discharges or acquits an accused and is of the opinion that there was no reasonable ground for making the accusation against the said accused, then he may by the order of discharge or acquittal call upon the person upon whose complaint or information the accusation was made to show cause why he should not pay compensation, to such accused. Thus, the requirement of this subsection is that there must be an order of discharge or acquittal and the Magistrate must be of the opinion that there was no reasonable ground for making the accusation. This opinion of the Magistrate must be an opinion on the basis of some objective data and not a fanciful or whimsical opinion and if these two requirements are satisfied, then the Magistrate would give a show cause to the person upon whose complaint or information the accusation was made Sub - Section (2) of Section 250 provides that the Magistrate shall consider the cause shown by the person concerned and must be satisfied that there was no reasonable ground for making the accusation and then he will record reasons and * make an order regarding the amount of compensation to be paid by such complainant or informant to the accused. Thus, under Sub - Section (2) of Section 250, the Magistrate must consider any cause which the complainant may show and must also record such cause and then the Magistrate must be satisfied again after considering the cause shown that there was no reasonable ground for making the accusation. This satisfaction of the learned Magistrate also must be a satisfaction on objective basis about the total absence of any reasonable ground for the accusation or that the informant had actual knowledge of the falsity of the accusation. The further requirement of the Sub -section is that the Magistrate in his order awarding compensation must state his reasons why he deems that there was absence of any reasonable ground for making the accusation and for that purpose he must deal with the facts of the case with a criticism of the incident involved. Merely saying that prosecution evidence is unsatisfactory and on consideration of the show cause the Magistrate considers the accusation as groundless, 'is not sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 250 of the Code. It is incumbent on the Magistrate to record a finding that the accusation was groundless. The recording of such finding is essential and an omission to do so vitiates the proceeding. The obvious object of the Legislature in requiring the Magistrate to record his reasons in such cases is that the power given under the section should not be used indiscriminately and further to enable the Court of Appeal or revision to judge the sufficiency of the grounds on which the order is based. Keeping in view the aforesaid requirements of law, I would examine the impugned order together with the judgment of acquittal and the evidence in the case.